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Abstract
Who Owns the ‘First Rough Draft of History’?  suggests the withdrawal of copyright 
protection from hard-news journalism as a mechanism for “rescuing” the news from the 
inexorable downward spiral in quality and diversity caused by excessive media 
concentration.  Although copyright represents just one of the factors contributing to the 
“commodification” of news today, it is a significant factor, and one with a long, unsavory 
relationship with censorship and monopoly.
The article asserts that newspapers’ quest for copyright protection was an early 
step onto a slippery slope toward a property-based, rather than service-based ethos, and 
that removing protection may mark a first and at least symbolic step back from the abyss.  
It argues that copyright protection should be replaced by a highly circumscribed variant
of the misappropriation tort, coupled with authorial rights of attribution and integrity.  
It is doubtful that any of these proposed changes would prompt the media 
conglomerates to jettison otherwise profitable news operations, but, where they do, the 
resultant spin-offs may be more strongly committed to quality journalism.  Fine-tuning 
the copyright law with respect to news might also restore among executives and working 
journalists alike some sense of public service obligation.  And diluting the industry’s 
news-as-property attitude might even make a favorable impression on the increasingly 
disillusioned audience.
Perhaps, someday, the public will come to own what former Washington Post
publisher Philip Graham called the “first rough draft of history.”
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The copyright system, though constitutional, is broken.  It effectively and 
perpetually protects nearly all material that anyone would want to cite or 
use.  That’s not what the framers envisioned, and it’s not in the public 
interest.
Editorial, Free Mickey Mouse, Wash. Post A16 (Feb. 21, 2003).
19. What Defendants gain by appropriating Plaintiffs’ copyrighted 
material diminishes the value of Plaintiffs’ newspapers, websites, and 
their advertising opportunities. For example, Defendants are usurping the 
funds that Plaintiffs are entitled to receive from licensing these articles 
through their Permissions Desks, through their sale of reprints, and 
otherwise. These articles are Plaintiffs’ stock in trade. 
20. By copying Plaintiffs’ copyrighted articles verbatim and posting them 
on a site other than Plaintiffs’ websites, Defendants are also diverting 
readers that would otherwise read Plaintiffs’ newspapers and access 
Plaintiffs’ websites. This usurps Plaintiffs’ circulation figures, which, in 
turn, has damaged and will damage Plaintiffs’ ability to attract 
advertisers.
Complaint at 11-12, L. A. Times & Wash. Post v. Free Republic, 
No. 98-7840 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1998).
Although The Washington Post doubtless stands behind both of the quotations 
above, one suspects it stands considerably further behind the first than the second.  After 
all, as Judge Kozinski has said, “The simple fact is that the written word is a commodity; 
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3information is a commodity; truth is a commodity; fiction is a commodity.  There are no 
clear-cut lines between them.” 1   This article is dedicated to the proposition that Judge 
Kozinski is wrong… or rather should be wrong. 
When the Federal Communications Commission calls “The Howard Stern Show” 
news,2 when Fox News calls the phrase “fair and balanced” property, the time has come 
to redraw those lines.3
As news has become a smaller and smaller part of the business of corporate media 
enterprises,4 journalism has become a smaller and smaller part of “the news.”5
Journalism as public service is inexorably being replaced by “infotainment” as 
commodity.  Among other consequences, the public has lost what respect it may have had 
for newspapers and broadcast news, which are now lumped together with talk radio and 
reality television to become simply “the media.”  And while highly specialized forms of 
journalism can still find their niche markets, which some find independently 
problematic,6 the audience for mass circulation newspapers and mass audience broadcast 
journalism is in a steady decline. 
1
 Alex Kozinski, How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Love the Press, 3 Commun. L. & Policy 163, 
172 (1998).
2 In re Request of Infinity Broadcasting Operations Inc. for Declaratory Ruling, FCC Declaratory Ruling 
(Sept. 9, 2003) http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DA-03-2865A1.doc (accessed Nov. 13, 
2003).
3
 Compl., Fox News Network, LLC v. Penguin Group (USA) Inc., No. 601514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.  Aug. 7, 
2003) http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/ip/foxpenguin80703cmp.pdf (accessed Nov. 13, 2003).
4
 Bill Kovach & Tom Rosenstiel, The Elements of Journalism 32 (Three Rivers Press 2001) [hereinafter, 
Kovach & Rosenstiel].
5 Ken Auletta, Backstory: Inside the Business of News xiv (Penguin Press 2003)(“[A]s media companies 
get bigger, the role of the journalist within them is diminished.  Inside a behemoth like Disney, Time 
Warner, Viacom, or Clear Channel, news rarely matches the profit margins of other divisions, such as cable 
or programming, and thus loses internal clout.”) [hereinafter Auletta].
4Copyright law is not to blame for the commercialization of news.  Indeed, the 
evidence suggests that commercialization stimulated a demand for copyright protection 
where none had existed before.  Copyright law protected newspapers from the mid-19th 
Century, not to mention all of 20th Century broadcast news.  Copyright law may well 
have facilitated the growth of substantial news-oriented enterprises that could and did 
invest substantial sums into news gathering, production and distribution.  That said, the 
time may have come to reconsider whether a copyright regime that supports the 
conviction that news is just another commodity for sale best serves the public interest.   
This article asserts that the newspapers’ quest for copyright protection was an 
early step onto a slippery slope toward a property-based, rather than service-based ethos, 
and removing protection may mark a first and at least symbolic step back from the abyss.  
Extending copyright protection to newspapers was always unnecessary and probably 
unwise, even when qualified by the so-called fact/expression dichotomy and first sale and 
fair use doctrines.  Today, even these inadequate safeguards of the public domain are 
being threatened by legally sanctioned access restrictions and rights management 
regimes.  Worldwide, copyright protection for journalism is far less rigorous than in the 
U.S., and there may be some lessons to learn from abroad.    
Copyright protection for journalism should be replaced by a highly circumscribed
variant of the much-criticized misappropriation tort, coupled with authorial rights of 
attribution and integrity that supersede the American work-made-for-hire doctrine.  
Transformative uses of journalism work product, i.e., new products in the same market, 
or the same product in different markets, should be encouraged – the better to serve the 
6 See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, republic.com 3-5 (Princeton Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter Sunstein].  Sunstein 
posits a scenario in which everyone has access to “The Daily Me,” containing only the information that 
5framers’ objective to promote knowledge – and the duration of any protection at all 
should be severely limited.
It is doubtful that any of the changes proposed here would prompt the media 
conglomerates to jettison otherwise profitable news operations, but, where they do, the 
resultant spin-offs may be more strongly committed to quality journalism.  Fine-tuning 
the copyright law with respect to news might restore among executives and working 
journalists alike some sense of public service obligation.  And diluting the industry’s 
news-as-property attitude might even make a favorable impression on the increasingly 
disillusioned audience.  
Part I examines the state of contemporary journalism, particularly with respect to 
the propertization of news.  After inadequately summarizing a theoretical foundation laid 
out by C. Edwin Baker, it concludes that whatever benefits news-as-property may have 
brought to the public in the past, the time has come for the public to reclaim the news 
from the media conglomerates.  Part II traces the history of copyright protection for news, 
from its origins in censorship to the American copyright regime today, with emphasis on 
the run up to the 1909 amendments that first codified protection for newspapers.  It 
concludes that neither the fact-expression dichotomy, nor the fair use doctrine, 
adequately protects the public interest in news.
Part III advocates the removal of copyright protection for all printed and 
broadcast news, imposing only a 24-hour embargo on republication or rebroadcasting and 
the moral rights of attribution and integrity.  It also deals with real or imagined problems 
with this approach and suggests ways of dealing with them, including defining news, 
curtailing free riders, and preserving quality journalism.
suits each consumer – at the expense of the shared experiences that he sees as vital to our democracy. 
6Part I   Where are we now?
A.  Who owns the news?  
Under both American copyright law7 and international copyright agreements,8 the 
“news of the day” belongs to the public.  Once that “news” is communicated, however, 
American law provides that copyright subsists in the expression which embodies the 
news.9  That copyright is owned by the author,10 which, for most of the news that 
concerns us here, is defined as the publisher or broadcasting company.11
So, who owns the publishers and broadcasting companies?  When we examine ownership 
patterns of newspapers, magazines, broadcasters, cable operators, and other media 
7
 The U.S. Copyright Act, provides that, “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of 
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or 
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such 
work.” 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).  News, in the abstract, is repeatedly held to be encompassed by this provision.  
See, e.g., Harper & Row v. The Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 557 (1985) (“The Second Circuit noted, 
correctly, that copyright’s idea/expression dichotomy ‘strike[s] a definitional balance between the First 
Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while still protecting an 
author’s expression.’”)  
8 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, art. 2(8) (July 24, 1971), 1986 U.S.T. 
LEXIS 160 [hereinafter Berne Convention], explicitly excludes from the scope of protection “news of the 
day” and “miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information.” 
9
 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).  Technically, the information must be “fixed in a tangible medium of expression”; 
typically, the requisite fixation occurs when the news is published or when the first copy of a broadcast is 
made.  See Ga. TV Co. v. TV News Clips, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 939, 946 (N.D. Ga. Atlanta Div. 1989) 
(“copyright protection attaches to the broadcast feature only when the first copy of the transmission is 
made”).
10
 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
11
 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) provides that, “In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for 
whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless the parties have 
expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by them, owns all of the rights comprised in the 
copyright.”  A “work made for hire” is a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment or commissioned work upon mutual written agreement. 17 U.S.C. § 101.  After New York 
Times Co. v. Tasini, 533 U.S. 483 (2001), freelance contracts now typically include a “work made for hire” 
clause or other provisions granting publishers the right to use purchased freelance articles without 
meaningful restriction or further compensation.  See, e.g., Marx v. Globe Newspaper Co., 2002 Mass. 
Super. LEXIS 455 (2002) (finding that The Boston Globe newspaper was entitled to impose such license 
terms on its freelancers).
7companies for whom news represents more than a de minimis percentage of content, we 
find an unmistakable and well-documented trend toward concentration.  
Consider first the newspaper industry and the rise of group ownership.  In 1923, 
31 newspaper groups owned a total 153 newspapers – about 7% of all daily 
newspapers.12  “By 1996, 126 groups published an aggregate of 1,151 newspapers, 
accounting for 76% of the total number of dailies and 82% of daily circulation.” 13  At the 
same time, competition among newspapers within cities declined dramatically.  In 1923, 
502 cities had two or more directly competing newspapers; by 1996, only 19 cities or 
1.3% of all cities and towns with daily newspapers had direct competition among daily 
newspapers.14
Magazine publishing is marginally less concentrated than newspaper publishing, 
and the trend is toward even more dispersion.15  Of the 50 largest-circulation titles in 
1997, however, only three are oriented toward a general news market: Time (14th), 
Newsweek (19th), U.S. News and World Report (29th).16  Of those three, only U.S. News
is independently owned.17 Time is owned by one of the largest media conglomerates in 
the world, AOL Time Warner, with annual revenues exceeding $40 billion;18 Newsweek
12
 Benjamin M. Compaine & Douglas Gomery, Who Owns the Media: Competition and Concentration in 
the Mass Media Industry 8 (Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 3d ed. 2000)[hereinafter Compaine & Gomery].
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 161.
16 Id. at 164.
17 Id.
8is owned by the Washington Post Corp., which is relying less and less on news for its 
total revenue each year.19
Commercial broadcast television is dominated large multimedia conglomerates:  
Walt Disney Corp., which owns ABC; General Electric, which owns NBC; Viacom, 
which owns CBS and UPN; News Corp., which owns Fox; and the aforementioned Time 
Warner, which owns the WB network.20  The PAX network was launched in 1998 by 
Paxon Communications, which owned 50 local television stations at the time.21
Although television networking, by itself, is a roughly breakeven financial 
proposition, station ownership enjoys high profit margins.22  Television stations, like 
daily newspapers, are increasingly owned in media groups – especially after the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated the cap on the number of stations that any 
one company could own and permitted any company to own stations covering up to 35% 
of TV households.23  As of April 1998, the top 25 groups, whose members owned or 
18
 Press Release from AOL Time Warner, AOL Time Warner Reports Results for 2002 Full Year and 
Fourth Quarter (Jan. 29, 2003), http://www.aoltimewarner.com/investors/ quarterly_earnings/2002_4q/ 
release.adp (accessed Nov. 22, 2003).
19
 Michael Scherer, The Post Company’s New Profile, 2002 Col. Journ. Rev. 44 (Sept./Oct.) (reporting that 
newspaper and magazine divisions’ contribution to revenues declined from 68 percent of the total in 1993 
to 51 percent in 2002). 
20
 Jonathan Levy, Marcelino Ford-Livene & Anne Levine, Broadcast Television: Survivor in a Sea of 
Competition 27-28 (Fed. Commun. Commn. Off. Plans & Policies Working Paper No. 37  Sept. 2002) 
(available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-226838A22.doc) [hereinafter FCC 
37].
21Compaine & Gomery, supra n. 12, at 208.
22
 FCC 37, supra n. 20, at 39.
23 Compaine & Gomery, supra n. 12, at 222.
9controlled 432 or 36% of the 1,202 commercial television stations in the country, up from 
33% in 1997 and 25% in 1996.24
At this writing, it remained to be seen how the FCC’s order of June 2, 2003, 
lifting the ban on cross-ownership of newspapers and television stations and relaxing 
other ownership rules will alter this picture,25 but the early speculation had “mighty” 
growing mightier, “while smaller competitors fall by the wayside.”26  Opponents 
mounted challenges to the FCC order in both the courts and Congress, and the Third 
Circuit stayed its effect.27
Although television stations had always been required to dedicate some air time to 
public affairs under the FCC’s Fairness Doctrine,28 TV news only became a profit center 
in the 1990s.29  Those profits flowed not from better hard news coverage, but from highly 
profitable news magazine shows like CBS’s 60 Minutes and 48 Hours, NBC’ s Dateline, 
and ABC’s 20/20 and Prime Time Live.30 By the late 1990s, these programs accounted 
for more than 10 hours per week in prime time in the three largest networks.31
24 Id.
25FCC Press Release, FCC Sets Limits on Media Concentration (June 2, 2003) (describing Report and 
Order, FCC 03-127 (June 2, 2003), and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking).
26
 Alec Klein & David A. Vise, Media Giants Hint That They Might Be Expanding, 126 Wash. Post A6 
(June 3, 2003).  See also Mark Fitzgerald & Lucia Moses, Putting it Together, 135 Editor & Publisher 10 
(Feb. 18, 2002)(offers an early look at expected newspaper-broadcast cross-ownership mergers). 
27 Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 18390 (3d Cir. Sept. 3, 2003).  Earlier, the 
House of Representatives approved legislation that to roll back much of the FCC’s action by a vote of 400 
to 21.  H.R. 2799, 108th Cong., 149 Cong. Rec. H7369 (daily ed. July 23, 2003). The Senate subsequently 
approved 55-40 a joint resolution to disapprove the FCC’s proposal.  Sen. Jt. Res. 17, 108th Cong., 149 
Cong. Rec. S11519 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 2003).
28 See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 377 (1969) (upholding FCC Fairness Doctrine that  
“broadcasters must give adequate coverage to public issues … and coverage must be fair in that it 
accurately reflects the opposing views”).
29 Compaine & Gomery, supra n. 1 2, at 215.
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Most Americans actually receive their televised news programming over a coaxial 
cable, rather than over the air, regardless of its source.32  Locally, cable operators are 
almost always monopolies;33 nationally, they too are increasingly concentrated in large 
media groups (including both multiple system operators and networks).34  Parent 
companies of the top cable television operations are household names:  Time Warner, 
which owns the CNN family of stations; Walt Disney, which owns the ESPN sports 
channels; News Corp., which owns the Fox news networks; and General Electric, which 
controls MSNBC and CNBC.35   At this writing, News Corp. was making a strong bid to 
control the primary alternative to cable, direct satellite broadcasting (DBS).36
Radio offers yet another source of news to the public, although original news 
gathering is relatively rare on radio today.  Stations typically carry network or syndicated 
news programming, often with a few local headlines culled from wire services or local 
newspapers.37  Only news/talk and all-news formatted stations hire their own reporters,38
30 Id. at 215-16.
31 Id. at 216.
32 Id. at 247.
33 Id.
34 Id. at 250.
35 Id. at 252.
36 On Dec. 19, 2003, the FCC gave conditional approval to the sale of Hughes Electronics 
Corp.’s DirecTV, the nation’s largest DBS system.  In the Matter of General Motors 
Corp. and Hughes Electronics Corp., Transferors, and The News Corp. Ltd., Transferee, 
For Authority to Transfer Control, MB Docket No. 03-124 (Dec. 19, 2003) [hereinafter In 
re General Motors].
37 Compaine & Gomery, supra n. 12, at 293.
38 Id. at 293.
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and the latter represents less than 1% of the radio market.39  News/talk stations represent 
a larger share of the market, about 12%-13% of the market,40  but in most cases the news 
presented by those stations seems to be drowned out by the overwhelming volume of 
talk.
Thus, most people receive most of their news from a local monopoly (newspaper 
or cable company) owned or controlled by a large media company.  And, overall, the 
trend toward concentration seems inexorable.  So what?  Conventional wisdom says that 
monopolization of news sources locally and concentration of ownership nationally 
diminishes the number and diversity of voices that reach the public.  Intuitively, at least, 
the marketplace of ideas would seem to become poorer. 
But the evidence is at least mixed. Benjamin M. Compaine writes: 
The overwhelming weight of the research has shown that, with snapshots 
taken over several decades, corporately owned newspapers and 
“monopoly” newspapers are, overall, either indistinguishable from family-
owned papers or, by some accounts, superior.   
There is little empirical evidence that either chain-owned 
newspapers or newspapers in single-firm cities as a group provide poorer 
service to readers or advertisers than independent or competing 
newspapers.41
And while it might be difficult to find much difference among network and local 
affiliate news broadcasts, most Americans have access to National Public Radio, the 
Public Broadcasting System, and C-SPAN, whose journalism – mediated and unmediated 
39 Id. at 295.
40 Id.
41 Compaine & Gomery, supra n. 12, at 54.
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– is as good as any, anywhere.  CNN, Fox News, and MSNBC might be more alike than 
different, but they set the standard for coverage and delivery of breaking news.   
Washington Post veterans Leonard Downie and Robert Kaiser point out that the 
“best news products [have] continued to thrive in the marketplace.
The New York Times, National Public Radio, the Wall Street Journal, the 
Washington Post – all have done well journalistically and financially, 
though the advertising recession of  2000-2001 hurt them all.  The best 
metropolitan papers also thrived, including the St. Petersburg Times, the 
Dallas Morning News, the Sacramento Bee and the Portland Oregonian.  
Those newspapers and television news broadcasts that declined in quality 
– the Miami Herald, the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, CBS News – lost more 
of their audience than the best news media.42
Then, too, we have the Internet, which arguably raises the number of publishers 
and broadcasters to infinity.  Even so strident a media critic as Robert McChesney writes 
that, “For activists of all political stripes, the Web increasingly plays a central role in 
organizing and educational activities.”43  That may not be journalism in the conventional 
sense, but it provides determined and discriminating consumers with all of the facts and 
opinions they need to make the decisions that a democratic society expects of them.  
So, what’s wrong?  Good journalism continues to exist and even thrive, 
notwithstanding the occasional lapse by America’s finest.44  Arguably, there is more good 
journalism available than ever before; unarguably, there is more information available 
than ever before.
42
 Leonard Downie Jr. & Robert G. Kaiser, The News About the News: American Journalism in Peril 29 
(Vintage Books 2003) [hereinafter Downie & Kaiser].
43
 Robert W. McChesney, Rich Media, Poor Democracy: Communicating Politics in Dubious Times 183 
(The New Press 2000) [hereinafter McChesney].
44
 The widespread schadenfreude prompted by the recent Jayson Blair episode is itself the best evidence of 
the New York Times’s overall quality. For a sampling, see Journalism.org at 
http://www.journalism.org/resources/briefing/archive/blair.asp#blair (accessed Feb. 1, 2004).  
13
What’s wrong is that most of us don’t read the New York Times or watch 
Nightline or listen to NPR or scour the Web for contrasting views on the important issues 
of the day.  Instead, we watch the six o’clock news on television (sometimes), read the 
local chain newspaper (maybe), and see (or click past) AOL’s choice of headlines on the 
Internet.   And it’s dreadful.  Whatever news value these media may offer is drowned out 
by commercialism, sensationalism and junk.45
Downie and Kaiser point out that, where news makes a relatively small 
contribution to overall profits, the news hole is increasingly sacrificed to higher value 
entertainment.  Straight news broadcasts are often used to promote entertainment 
programming, while so-called broadcast newsmagazines feature so many crime and 
celebrity stories that they compete for prime-time ratings with dramas and sitcoms.46
Where news still contributes substantially to an owner’s bottom line,
“[n]ewspaper editors and television news directors… have been held more 
accountable for controlling costs and increasing profits than for improving 
the quality of their journalism.”47
One way to increase profits, says Herbert Gans, is to add “ ‘style’ and other ‘soft’ 
news sections in the hope of attracting, or at least maintaining, more readers or viewers 
and advertisers.”48  Often that means increasing reliance on the soft news output of 
45 See, e.g., Matthew C. Ehrlich, The Journalism of Outrageousness: Tabloid Television News vs. 
Investigative News, 155 Journalism & Mass Comm. Monographs (Feb. 1996).   I use the term “junk” 
advisedly.  To paraphrase Neil Postman, I’m not concerned about the undisguised junk one finds in the 
media, but rather the junk that publishers and broadcasters pass off as news.  See Neil Postman, Amusing 
Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business 16 (Penguin Books 1985). 
46
 Downie & Kaiser, supra n. 42, at 25.
47 Id. See also Geneva Overholser, Editor, Inc., 20 Amer. Journalism Rev. 58 (Dec. 1998).
48
 Herbert J. Gans, Democracy and the News 23 (Oxford Univ. Press 2003) [hereinafter Gans].
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national syndicates at the expense of local hard news reporting and, most notably, foreign 
news.49  On the latter point, Gans was speaking primarily about the television networks.  
But even the revered New York Times has experienced a decline in international news 
coverage, relying more and more on “borrowed” news, that is, news first disseminated by 
and attributed to another news organization.50
But these are merely symptoms of a much deeper malady that pervades today’s 
mass media: the absence of a public service ethos in what passes as journalism.  I say 
“what passes,” because public service is a defining element of journalism.  Indeed, that 
notion runs throughout the literature of contemporary journalism criticism.  McChesney 
writes:
The clear trajectory of our media and communication world tends toward 
ever-greater corporate concentration, media conglomeration, and 
hypercommercialism.  The notion of public service – that there should be 
some motive for media other than profit – is in rapid retreat if not total 
collapse.  The public is regarded not as a democratic polity, but simply as 
a mass of consumers.51
It is not necessary to subscribe to McChesney’s leftist, anti-corporate philosophy 
to see that he’s right on this point.  Downie and Kaiser also lament the loss of a public 
service orientation in today’s media.  The great newspaper families “drew pleasure from 
their roles as purveyors of a public service – good journalism” – even when profitability 
was meager.   Even the first owners of the television networks were “willing to sacrifice 
some profit for public service.”52
49 Id.
50
 Daniel Riffe et al., International News and Borrowed News in the New York Times: An Update, 70 
Journalism Q. 638 (1993). 
51
 McChesney, supra n. 43, at 76-77.
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Kovach and Rosenstiel put public service, which they characterize as “loyalty to 
citizens,” as the second element of journalism, subordinate only a commitment to the 
truth.53  James Fallows writes that journalism exists for reasons other than satisfying the 
desire of publishers and broadcasters to make money, but to satisfy the public’s desire for 
meaningful information.54  Even Jack Fuller, a journalist’s journalist, but also president 
of the Tribune Publishing Co., defends success in the marketplace as necessary to ensure 
the independence required to fulfill newspapers’ social purpose of providing the 
information people need.55
To Fuller, “the question is not whether a newspaper should serve the public 
interest or the financial interests of its owners.  The question is how it can best square the 
two.”56  As one might expect, most of the solutions proposed in the literature depend on 
reform within the media corporations, led by the professional journalists.  Fuller 
emphasizes the “church and state” metaphor coined by Time Magazine to refer to the 
separation between business and editorial departments within media corporations.57
Fallows sees the trend called “public journalism” as a good starting point.58  And Gans 
52
 Downie & Kaiser, supra n. 42, at 26.
53
 Kovach & Rosenstiel, supra n. 4, at 51.
54
 James Fallows, Breaking the News: How the Media Undermine American Democracy 129 (Vintage
Books 1997) [hereinafter Fallows].
55
 Jack Fuller, News Values: Ideas for an Information Age 198 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1997).
56 Id. at 199.
57 Id.
58
 Fallows, supra n. 54 at 247.  I will not get into the “public journalism” or “civic journalism” debate in 
this article, except to say that I tend to reject the concept that journalists ought to practice their craft in a 
manner calculated to improve civic life, rather than see civic life improved by practicing their craft in a 
manner consistent with high journalistic values.  For more on the movement, visit The Pew Center for 
Civic Journalism at http://www.pewcenter.org, The Civic Journalism Initiative at 
http://access.mpr.org/civic_j, Public Journalism Bibliography on Poynter Online at 
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offers a number of suggestions, including “user-friendly” news, localizing national and 
international news, explanatory journalism, and more.59
Understandably, media critics are generally uncomfortable looking to the law for 
solutions to this problem.  If the First Amendment means anything, it means that 
government ought not be telling journalists how to do their jobs.60  The exception has 
been broadcasting, where regulation has been held constitutionally permissible,61 and 
there was no dearth of media critics calling upon the Federal Communications 
Commission to refrain from lifting the ownership caps on radio and television stations 
last summer.62  Antitrust laws undoubtedly apply to media companies,63 but neither the 
http://poynteronline.org/content/content_view.asp?id=1223, Public Journalism Network at 
http://www.pjnet.org (accessed Feb. 1, 2004).
59
 Gans, supra n. 48, at 91-112.
60 See Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (“The choice of material to go into a newspaper, 
and the decisions made as to limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public issues 
and public officials – whether fair or unfair – constitute the exercise of editorial control and judgment. It 
has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent 
with First Amendment guarantees of a free press as they have evolved to this time.”)
61 Red Lion Broad. Co., 395 U.S. at 390 (“Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is 
permitted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique 
medium.”)
62
 See notes 24-27 and accompanying text.  See, e.g., Neil Hickey, FCC: Ready, Set, Consolidate, 42 
Colum. Journalism Rev. 5 (July/Aug. 2003):
The oddest of bedfellows joined forces to fight the proposed changes.  On the right: the 
National Rifle Association, Family Research Council, Parents Television Council; on the 
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63 Associated Press v. U.S., 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945) (“The First Amendment, far from providing an argument 
against application of the Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. ... Freedom of the 
press from governmental interference under the First Amendment does not sanction repression of that 
freedom by private interests.”)  See also Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of 
Antitrust, 62 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 503, 517-18 (2001) (“[M]edia mergers should be carefully scrutinized for loss 
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FCC nor the Justice Department has shown much inclination to stop or slow 
concentration in the media industry.64
This article suggests that withdrawing copyright protection from print and 
broadcast journalism may represent a modest, perhaps largely symbolic step toward 
reducing the sense among media companies that news is just a commodity and restoring a 
sense of public service in the practice of journalism.  This thesis presupposes that 
copyright law is at least a modest contributor to the problem, and we find theoretical 
support for that proposition in the work of Professor Baker.
B.  The Baker Analysis
Baker points out that media content, once produced, is a “public good”; that is, its  
consumption in no way reduces its availability to others.65   Ideally, then, the public 
would derive maximum value from media content as its cost approached zero.  But a 
zero-cost regime would provide no incentive for producing media content, so copyright 
law is imposed to create a private property interest that encourages the content 
production.  “Exceptions” to that regime – such as the fact-expression dichotomy and fair 
use doctrine – permit free use of the content “whenever free use adds more value than it 
‘costs’” in reduced incentives to produce more content.66
Baker suggests, however, that the incentive value of copyright law is of little 
importance with respect to noncommercial political or cultural communications and may 
64 See, e.g., In re General Motors, supra n. 36, and accompanying text.  Columbia Journalism Review
maintains a list of more than 40 media companies and the properties they own.  See “Who Owns What” at 
http://archives.cjr.org/owners/ (visited Feb. 1, 2004).
65
 C. Edwin Baker, Media, Markets and Democracy 15 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2002) [hereinafter Baker].
66 Id.
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even be exaggerated with respect to some commercial speech.67  As we will explore 
further in Part III, news would appear to be one of those categories that benefits least 
from the incentive to produce afforded by copyright protection.  In any event, Baker 
points out that copyright protection “not only favors commercialization, but also tilts 
production toward particular types of content.”68
Since copyright does not protect the purely factual elements of news, its 
effectiveness in creating incentives to gather and disseminate news is questionable.  More 
likely, copyright favors more investment in “unique entertainment content” and “flashy 
presentation” and less investment in hard news … “especially news that is expensive to 
obtain. … Anchorperson personalities and their expressive delivery, not facts and ideas 
that other stations can freely appropriate, are the [broadcast] station’s unique goods.”69
Competitive, profit-oriented pressures could lead media entities to 
abandon expensive, investigative journalism and replace it with 
cheaper, routine beat reporting, or even cheaper “press-release” or 
wire service journalism.  The market could tilt journalism toward 
stories that are the easiest (i.e., cheapest) to uncover and, even 
more troubling, the easiest to explain or the most titillating.70
Baker acknowledges that, “[t]o the extent that a broad [copy]right increases the 
commercial rewards of writing and of journalism, it provides greater incentives for 
67 Id. at 16.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 17-18.
70 Id. at 196.
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undertaking that work.”71  On the other hand, he says, copyright might be the one form of 
structural media regulation that would benefit audiences more by its absence.72
Since copyright is a “legal mechanism for restricting the content of other people’s 
expression,”73 ratcheting back on the scope of copyright for journalism should face no 
serious constitutional obstacle.74  The case can be further strengthened by exploring the 
historical relationship between journalism and copyright law and inadequacies of 
copyright “exceptions” to protect the public’s interest in news.
Part II – How did we get here?
A. Copyright’s Precursors and Censorship
The connection between early copyright law and royal censorship is hardly a 
compelling reason for journalists to shun today’s intellectual property protection.  Ray 
Patterson notes that “[c]ensorship in England began without any reference to copyright, 
and there is little doubt that copyright would have developed without it.”75   But Patterson 
and others have chronicled a relationship between the two that, if nothing else, ought to 
suggest that journalism and copyright may not be the most compatible partners.  
71 Id. at 210.
72 Id. at 102.
73 Id. at 305.
74
 Indeed, Baker believes that the First Amendment at least permits “government structural interventions to 
promote journalists’ and editors’ freedom the scope of copyright protection and protect that freedom from 
private threats.” Id. at  281. I am not ready to go that far, but I do agree with Baker that the scope of 
copyright protection should be “subject to a rigorous First Amendment test of heightened scrutiny.”  Id. at 
305.
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 Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright in Historical Perspective 114 (Vand. Univ. Press 1968) [hereinafter 
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Mitchell Stephens writes, “When they were not exploiting the printing presses 
themselves, monarchs and their ministers busied themselves monitoring the presses –
which were ostensibly in private hands – and making sure the news others printed on 
them was not, as a British jurist was to put it some years later, ‘possessing the people 
with an ill opinion of  the government.’”76  If the negative instruments of Tudor 
censorship regimes – treason and seditious libel laws – were more colorful, the positive 
instruments – licensing and monopolies – were more effective and long lived.  
“Privileges” to print certain types of information were distributed to certain 
printers as early as 1467 in Berne,77 but Henry, Mary, and Elizabeth of England raised the 
practice to a high art.  On Christmas Day, 1534, Henry, who had earlier banned heretical 
and blasphemous books, issued a proclamation requiring all printers to obtain a royal 
license.78  Not coincidentally, that was the same year the Act of Succession prohibited 
any “slander” of Henry’s marriage to Anne Boleyn, on penalty of death.  Four years later, 
by royal proclamation, Henry would establish a licensing system for all books, requiring 
any manuscript intended for publication to be submitted to royal censors, empowered to 
excise seditious opinions and other objectionable materials or deny license to print 
altogether.79
76
 Mitchell Stephens, A History of News 90-91 (Penguin Books 1989) (quoting Chief 
Justice Holt of the Court of King’s Bench, 1704, cited in Fred S. Siebert, Four Theories 
of the Press 24 (Illini Books 1963)) [hereinafter Stephens].
77 Stephens, supra n. 76, at 90-91.
78
 Michael Emery & Edwin Emery, The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media 8 
(Prentice-Hall 1988) [hereinafter Emery].
79 See Leonard W. Levy, Emergence of a Free Press 6 (Oxford Univ. Press 1985).
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Henry’s daughter Mary built on that foundation in 1557 by issuing a royal charter 
giving the ancient guild of scribes, limners, printers, publishers, and dealers known as the 
Stationers’ Company the exclusive rights, other than the crown, to operate and enforce 
the licensing regime.  As Siva Vaidhyanathan points out, 
Only members of the company could legally produce books.  The only 
books they would print were approved by the Crown.  The company was 
authorized to confiscate unsanctioned books.  It was a sweet deal for the 
publishers.  They got exclusivity – monopoly power to print and distribute 
specific works – the functional foundation to copyright.  The only price 
they paid was relinquishing the freedom to print disagreeable or dissenting 
texts.80
During the reign of Mary’s successor, Elizabeth I, the relationship between 
censorship and the Stationers’ monopoly grew even closer.  Patterson demonstrates that 
the Stationers saw the increasing need for censorship as a lever they could use to enhance 
and perpetuate the economic prosperity that monopoly brought.81  The Stationers’ 
lobbying played an important, although not decisive role, in the promulgation of the Star 
Chamber Decree of 1586, the major regulatory achievement of  the Elizabethan period.82
This comprehensive prescription for controlling the presses was expressly intended to 
deal with “contentyous and disorderlye persons professinge the arte or mysterye of 
Pryntinge or sellinge of bookes.”83
The political chaos that marked the Stuart dynasty gave rise to both the first 
prototypes of the modern newspaper and the use of monopoly power to suppress them.  
80
 Siva Vaidhyanathan, Copyrights and Copywrongs 37 (NYU Press 2001) [hereinafter 
Vaidhyanathan]. 
81
 Patterson, supra n. 75, at 115.
82 Id. at 116.
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Emery points out that neither the balladeers nor pamphleteers of the time were up to the 
demand for news about the various religious and political struggles of the early 17th 
Century.  The commercial news-letters were better, but not generally affordable.84  The 
corantos that emerged around 1620 only covered foreign news, but that did not stop 
James I from using the Stationers to arrest and imprison coranto printer Thomas Archer 
for “great liberty of discourse concerning matters of state.”85
Domestic news coverage was even more controversial, but, with the king and 
Parliament in stalemate, diurnalls carrying local news surfaced in the 1640s.  The 
Stationers had succeeded in promoting a more draconian Star Chamber Decree in 1637, 
but the Long Parliament abolished the Star Chamber itself in 1641 and relaxed many of 
the restrictions on the press.  The Stationers continued to press for controls, as shown by 
their second petition to Parliament in 1643.  
Acknowledging the importance of printing, the petition reminds Parliament that 
“it is not mere Printing, but well ordered Printing that merits so much favour and respect, 
since in things precious and excellent, the abuse (if not prevented) is commonly as 
dangerous, as the use is advantageous.”86  Components of  “well ordered” printing 
included censorship, monopoly over the printing presses, and copyright, all of which 
were included in the Ordinance of 1643.  Its emphasis on the latter, the “propriety of 
83 Id.
84
 Emery, supra n. 78, at 9.
85 Id.
86
 Patterson, supra n. 75, at 128.
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Copies,” brought us closer to modern copyright law,87 but the link with censorship was to 
continue for some years yet.
Indeed, the proliferation of newspaper prototypes – the curanto, diurnall, mercury 
and intelligencer – was largely responsible for the Ordinance of 1647, styled “An 
Ordinance against unlicensed or scandalous Pamphlets, and for the better Regulating of 
Printing.”88 Patterson points out that this was the first act of censorship directed as much 
to authors as to printers, providing
[t]hat what person soever shall Make, Write, Print, Publish, Sell or Utter… 
any Book, Pamphlet, Treatise, Ballad, Libel, Sheet or Sheets, the Author, 
Printer and Licenser thereunto prefixed) shall for every such Offence, 
suffer, pay and incur the Punishment, Fine and Penalty hereafter 
mentioned….89
Two years later, those penalties were increased by the Ordinance of 1649, aimed 
at “the mischiefs arising from weekly pamphlets.”90  Under that act, the Clerk of 
Parliament was designated to license the pesky newsbooks,91 which had flourished in the 
civil war period.92
According to Emery, “the press again fell upon evil days” with the advent of 
Oliver Cromwell’s dictatorship,93 although Patterson indicates that the Puritans ultimately 
87 Id. at 129.
88 Id. at 131-32.
89 Id. at 132.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 133.
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 Emery, supra n. 78, at 11.
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failed in their efforts at controlling the press.94  After the Restoration, the Stationers 
lobbied for the restoration of their old power.  The Licensing Act of 1662 was similar to 
the Ordinances of 1647 and 1649, but the Company lost its role in press censorship to the 
Surveyor of the Press.  The Licensing Act was allowed to lapse in 1679, and, although 
the Stationers tried to renew their monopoly through a censorship law as late as 1703,95
the link between copyright and censorship was finally severed.  Copyright law, beginning 
with the Statute of Anne in 1709, had lost its censorship function.96
Or has it?  Patterson ends his study with a prescient warning that today’s 
copyright law typically grants publishers complete control of the work – the expression 
of ideas for profit.  “A vestige of the heritage of censorship in the law of copyright 
remains in the interest of profit.”97  Be that as it may, it is not the core of this argument, 
so we turn to the treatment of news media under historical and contemporary copyright 
law. 
B. Subject Matter of Copyright Before 1909
There is no textual evidence that the copyright laws of the 18th and 19th 
Centuries ever contemplated newspapers as covered subject matter.  The Statute of 
Anne,98 generally considered the first British copyright statute,99 covered books and parts 
94
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95 Id. at 141.
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of books, although the ambiguous phrase “other writings” was included in the 
parliamentary findings of frequent copying.100
By the time of the American constitutional convention, 12 of the13 states already 
had copyright laws.101  Most of the early American state statutes also covered only books, 
or books and writings,102 or books, maps and charts.103   Statutes of Connecticut (1783), 
Georgia (1786) and New York (1786) governed “any book or pamphlet… or… any map 
or chart.”104
To harmonize the various state copyright statutes,105  the framers authorized 
Congress “To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited 
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries.”106  But while the constitutional provision speaks only of “writings,” the  
99 But see Patterson, supra n. 75, at 143 (“Earlier English copyright acts, the Star Chamber Decrees of 1586 
and 1637, the Ordinances of 1643 and 1647, and the Licensing Act of 1662, were fundamentally censorship 
laws, which may explain why their relevance to the so-called first copyright act was ignored.”)
100
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significant.  “[T]he body of the act speaks only of books… and a learned commentator upon American law 
(2 Kent, Comm. 311) seems to think the English decisions on this subject (Cowp. 623; 11 East, 244, note) 
have been given upon the body of the statute of Anne, without laying any stress upon the words [‘]other 
writings[’] in the preamble.”  5 F. Cas. at 1001-1003.
101
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102 See, e.g., Maryland Statute of April 21, 1783, quoted in Patterson, supra n. 75, at 184; also U.S. 
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Copyright Laws]. 
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Federal Copyright Act of 1790 specified “maps, charts, and books,” including 
unpublished manuscripts.107
Any thought that newspapers might be subsumed by the inherent ambiguity of 
“writings” is quickly laid to rest with a look at the government-subsidized practice of 
newspaper exchanges.  At least until the availability of low-cost telegraphy became 
widespread,108 newspaper articles were more or less freely exchanged among publishers, 
with frontier newspapers often gleaning a substantial proportion of their news from 
Eastern city papers.  
The practice of exchanging newspapers goes back to colonial times.  Andrew 
Bradford, publisher of the American Weekly Mercury, launched in 1719 as Philadelphia’s 
first newspaper, gathered non-local news through the exchange of letters and the 
cultivation of correspondents around the world. 
Perhaps most important as a means of news gathering, Bradford and other 
publishers liberally copied one another’s papers.  Bradford borrowed from 
several dozen British publications and later, with the establishment of 
more papers in the colonies and improvements in transportation, he began 
helping himself to newspaper accounts published along the Atlantic Coast.  
Stories from other papers were typically printed verbatim and, in the 
Mercury’s first years of publication, sources were not regularly credited.  
Identification became more common later, however, and the Mercury’s
sources multiplied, relating to both European and American news.109
107
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Indeed, the very first policy regarding the carriage of newspapers by the colonial 
Post Office in 1758 recognized the practice of exchanging papers among printers and 
exempted those papers from any postage fees.110  That policy remained virtually 
unchanged until the 1870s.111  The importance of the exchanges is illustrated by evidence 
that postmaster-publishers occasionally punished rivals by delaying their exchange 
papers.112  The practice also served commercial interests and, during and after the 
Revolutionary War period, political interests as well.113  Preferential postal rates for 
newspapers were almost universally endorsed in the early days of the Republic, and the 
practice of exchanging newspapers among printers was a matter of concern to President 
Washington himself.114
When Congress enacted the first postal law in 1782, no reference was made to 
newspaper exchanges among printers, and the matter was left to the discretion of the 
110 Id. at 17.
111 Id. at 18.
112
 Id. at 19.
113 Id. at 20-21.  On the latter point, see especially Jeffrey L. Pasley, “The Tyranny of Printers”: 
Newspaper Politics in the Early American Republic 173 (Univ. Press of Va. 2001) [hereinafter Pasley]:
Free exchanges were initially a nationalizing force, as the colonial custom of free exchanges had 
been an imperializing one, binding together distant parts of the nation and world through information.  
With the rise of political divisions in the 1790s, that force began to work very differently, binding together 
like-minded partisans across space and fostering the growth of partisan newspaper networks.  Each editor 
began to focus on selecting materials that expressed his own views and helped promote his own political 
goals, arranging the newspapers he received along a political spectrum into which he could also insert 
himself.  Having identified some journals as political opponents, editors looked through them for 
outrageous remarks to score points against, arguments to answer, and misinformation to correct.  An 
especially powerful political essay or paragraph could spread through the country in a matter of weeks, and 
an especially well-executed newspaper could gain national, targeted exposure far beyond its own direct 
circulation.
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Postmaster General.115 Ten years later, however, Congress expressly provided for 
printers’ exchanges: “That every printer of newspapers may send one paper to each and 
every other printer of newspapers within the United States, free of postage, under such 
regulations as the Postmaster General shall provide.”116 Exchanges were so attractive 
that, by 1812, frontier newspapers were borrowing seven times more news than they 
gathered locally.117  In fact, regular, active news gathering did not begin until the 
1830s.118
Congressional support for the printers’ exchanges was so strong that the practice 
weathered any number of proposals by budget-conscious Postmasters General to curtail 
or end the practice during the early 19th Century.119  Occasionally, editors would append 
a notice to their stories and advertisements instructing distant editors to copy them, 
thereby extending the range of their influence.120  It is obvious from contemporary 
descriptions of how those exchanges were used that notions of copyright infringement 
were entirely alien to the process:
We seated ourselves at the… table, on which were scissors, paste-dish, 
pen and ink, the indispensable implements of our profession, to commence 
our ordinary labour.  At first, to prepare the subject matter of the next 
day’s daily Journal .  Having cast our eye over Mr. Lang’s New York 
Gazette, and Mr. Dwight’s Daily Advertiser, (our invariable standards of 
news from that city, notwithstanding the high repute of Mr. Stone’s 
Commercial) and clipped out a few paragraphs, the Washington papers 
115 Id. at 143.
116
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were next put in requisition.  An article in the National Journal, or the 
National Intelligencer, we undertook to remanufacturing (giving the 
Journal, or the Intelligencer credit for the new material).121
But if copyright protection was not an issue, editors felt strongly about receiving 
credit for their efforts.  Editorials regularly denounced the use of stories without proper 
attribution, and regular offenders might be struck from exchange lists.122  One early news 
magazine publisher lamented, “I have an article before me that I myself made, that was 
published at Boston as original, copied into a Baltimore paper without credit, and inserted 
in an Albany paper as belonging to the newspaper last noted.”123  A New Jersey editor 
acknowledged that news items were “common property,” but insisted that to “transplant 
original matter… unacknowledged, is neither honest nor honorable; … pillaging a paper 
is equal to picking a pocket.”124
Ultimately, the telegraph would erode the importance of postal exchanges, but 
exchanges remained “indispensable” to remote newspapers for 20 or more years after the 
telegraph was invented.125 At first, the telegraph was enlisted merely to help editors cover 
part of the distance between originating and consuming newspapers.  Increasingly, 
however, the economies of the telegraph dictated that news items be summarized, leaving 
to exchanges the distribution of more complex, opinionated, or narrowly focused 
121Id. at 147 (quoting the New England Galaxy as reprinted in the Nashville Republican, 
Nov. 20, 1824). 
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stories.126  Even after the rise of cooperative news agencies and the evolution of the 
modern, hard-news story form, exchanges were used to circulate features and political 
commentary.127  In 1851,  Post Office extended the free exchange privilege to include 
magazines.128
During the period 1847-1860, some 30 percent of the stories carried in daily and 
other newspapers were clipped from other papers, presumably received on exchange, but 
the free ride was coming to an end.  Bowing to pressure from Postmaster General 
Montgomery Blair, Congress eliminated the practice of free exchanges in 1873.129
Other evidence that news was not considered a proper subject for copyright 
protection in what little case law we have from those days.  In the early case of Clayton v. 
Stone, Circuit Justice Thompson cited both the text of the copyright law and the burden 
that copyright would impose on would-be registrants to hold that a price-current, an early 
form of commercial newspaper or newsletter, could not be the proper subject of 
copyright.130 Plaintiffs had argued that their publication qualified for copyright 
protection as a book, but the court rejected that view based on the “subject-matter of the 
work” in question.131  In an explanation later quoted extensively with approval by the 
Supreme Court in Baker v. Selden,132 Justice Thompson said the Copyright Act
126 Id. at 153.
127 Id. at 154.
128 Id. (citing 2 U.S. Postal Guide and Official Advertiser 40 (Aug. 1851)).  
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was passed in execution of the power here given, and the object, therefore 
was the promotion of science; and it would certainly be a pretty 
extraordinary view of the sciences to consider a daily or weekly 
publication of the state of the market as falling within any class of them.  
They are of a more fixed, permanent and durable character.  The term 
science cannot, with any propriety, be applied to a work of so fluctuating 
and fugitive form as that of a newspaper or pricecurrent, the subject-matter 
of which is daily changing, and is of more temporary use.  Although great 
praise may be due to the plaintiffs for their industry and enterprise in 
publishing this paper, yet the law does not contemplate their being 
rewarded in this way; it must seek patronage and protection from its utility 
to the public and not as a work of science.  The title of the act of congress 
is for the encouragement of learning (citation omitted), and was not 
intended for the encouragement of mere industry, unconnected with 
learning and the sciences.133
The court proceeded to recount the burdensome steps required at that time to 
secure a copyright, finding they could not “reasonably be applied to a work of so 
ephemeral a character as that of a newspaper.”134 Since the copyright had to be secured 
for every edition, rather than for an entire series, the court said,
it is so improbable that any publisher of a newspaper would go through 
this form for every paper, it cannot reasonably be presumed that congress 
intended to include newspapers under the term book.  That no such 
pretence has ever before been set up, either in England or in this country, 
affords a pretty strong argument that such publications were never 
considered as falling under the protection of the copyright laws.135
If that interpretation of the Copyright Act was still good law in 1880, when Baker 
v. Selden was decided, it was no longer so by 1886, when the very same court that 
decided Clayton v. Stone considered a copyright granted to Harper’s Weekly, described 
133
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as an “illustrated newspaper.”136  In Harper v. Shoppell, the court held that the “copyright 
of the plaintiff’s newspaper was a copyright of a book, within the meaning of the 
copyright laws.”137  Although the court ultimately held for the defendant on other 
grounds, the decision in no way questioned the validity of Harper’s copyright.  What had 
changed?
C. Propertization of News in 19th Century
The mid-19th Century saw continued expansion in the scope of copyright, both
legislatively and administratively.  In the 1831 general revision of the Act, copyright 
protection was extended to musical compositions and cuts and engravings.138
Photographs were added in 1865.139   And in 1870, Congress added paintings, drawings, 
chromos, statues, statuary, and “models or designs intended to be perfected as works of 
the fine arts.”140 Following the 1870 revision, the Copyright Office began accepting 
registrations as books from some weekly newspaper publishers.141
The 1870s have been singled out as a critical decade in the transition of American 
newspapers from an elite press, dependent for support upon political parties, to a 
136 Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. 519 (S.D.N.Y. 1886).
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politically independent, mass market business.142  During that decade, the number and 
size of newspapers nearly doubled, subscription prices declined, and independents came 
to outnumber partisan papers.143  These dramatic changes have been variously attributed 
to economic growth in the West and recovery in the South, rising literacy throughout the 
country, and vastly improved communication and transportation infrastructure.144 Above 
all, newspapers were making money.145
Newspapers were still not explicitly covered by the copyright statute, but the 
practice of registering newspapers as books enabled the Harper court to stand Justice 
Thompson’s analysis on its head.  In Clayton, Thompson had pointed out that, in 
England, literary productions need not be books “in the common and ordinary 
acceptation of the word” in order to enjoy copyright protection.146  “It may be printed on 
one sheet,” he wrote, to support the point that protection was “not to be determined by the 
size, form or shape in which it makes its appearance, but by the subject-matter of the 
work.”147
The Harper court omitted the final clause of that sentence, which lay at the very 
heart of Clayton, and all other reference to subject matter.  Instead, it used language from 
Clayton to support the proposition that “a book… may consist of a single sheet, as well as 
142
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a number of sheets bound together,”148 like Harper’s  illustrated newspaper.  To be sure, 
the Harper court could have distinguished the content of Harper’s Weekly from that of 
the price-current at issue in Clayton, but it did not.  Fine content distinctions played no 
part in the Harper decision.  
Metropolitan newspaper publishers had also begun to lobby Congress for 
copyright protection by the time Harper was decided, although their first efforts were 
half-hearted and, for more than twenty years, unsuccessful.149  As a consequence of the 
growing commercial value of news,150 major publishers developed extensive 
newsgathering networks and telegraphic wire services, then sought to protect their 
investment through copyright.151
By 1879, James W. Simonton, general agent for the Associated Press, would 
claim a “property in news… created by the fact of our collecting and concentrating it.”152
At the AP’s behest, Henry Watterson, editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal, was sent 
in 1884 on what he described as a “fool’s errand” to persuade Congress to provide 
explicit copyright protection for newspapers.153  Barbara Cloud discusses in some detail 
the four bills relating to news copyright that were introduced during the First Session of 
the 48th Congress. 
148 Harper v. Shoppell, 26 F. at 519.
149
 Cloud, supra n. 108, at 144.
150
 Id. at 141 (citing Gerald J. Baldasty, The Commercialization of News in the Nineteenth Century (U. 
Wis. Press 1992)).
151
 Cloud, supra n. 108, at 142.
152 Id. at 149 (citing Daniel J. Czitrom, Media and the American Mind: From Morse to McLuhan 26 (U. 
N.C. Press 1982)).  
153
 Cloud, supra n. 108, at 144 (citing Henry Watterson, Marse Henry: An Autobiography 104 (George H. 
Doran Co. 1919)).
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One bill154 allowed a periodical writer to copyright already published work after 
giving notice six times in publications; that bill and another155 would have granted 
copyright to newspaper “titles,” assumed to mean stories.156  More important were 
S.1728157 and its companion, H.R.5850,158 which gave newspapers the “sole right to 
print, issue and sell for a term of eight hours, dating from the hour of going to press,” the 
stories in the newspaper that exceeded 100 words.159  The eight-hour period was 
apparently reduced from twenty-four hours, which was also provided in H.R.4160, in 
order to mollify legislators who feared that the bill would solely benefit the Associated 
Press at the expense of country weeklies.160
Watterson insisted that the proposed law would not interfere with the weeklies’ 
practice of reprinting stories; they would be free to continue copying “anything that 
pleases them,” after 7 a.m., but the legislation ultimately failed.161  The weekly press, 
154
 H.R.62, 48th Cong. (Dec. 10, 1883).
155
 H.R.4160, 48th Cong. (Jan. 29, 1884).
156
 Cloud, supra n. 108, at 145 n. 17.
15748th Cong. (March 4, 1884). 
158
 48th Cong. (March 10, 1884).
159
 Cloud, supra n. 108, at 145.  Section 2 of the bill would provided further
That for any infringement of the copyright granted by the first section of this act the party 
injured may sue in any court of competent jurisdiction and recover in any proper action 
the damages sustained by him from the person making such infringement, together with 
the costs of the suit.
Intl. News Serv.  v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 265 n. 16 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) [hereinafter INS v. AP].
160
 Cloud, supra n. 108, at 146.
161 Justice Brandeis recounted that the bill “was reported on April 18, 1884, by the Committee on the 
Library, without amendment, and that it ought not to pass.  Journal of the Senate, 48th Congress, First 
Session, p. 548.  No further action was apparently taken on the bill.”  INS v. AP, 248 U.S. at 265 n. 16 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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which benefited from the practice of newspaper exchange, organized a substantial 
lobbying campaign, including letter-writing and petitioning.162  Other critics of the 
legislation found too little “original intellectual effort” in newsgathering to merit 
copyright protection.163  Whether the Harper court was aware of the legislative failure of 
the newspaper copyright is not apparent from the decision, but as long as newspapers 
could be protected as “books,” it may not have mattered one way or the other.  
That was certainly the view of  Richard Rogers Bowker, head of Publisher’s 
Weekly and the Publishers’ Copyright League.164  Writing in 1886, the same year Harper
was decided, Bowker acknowledged that  “[a] specific act to protect news for twenty-four 
hours has been proposed in Congress, but never passed.”165  But Bowker expressed 
confidence, probably based more on Copyright Office practice than any legal grounds, 
that “periodicals and books published in parts… come under the general designation of 
books.” 
Each issue of a magazine or other periodical must therefore be separately 
entered as though a separate book, although the title may be registered as a 
trade-mark once for all.  All copyrightable matter contained in the issue 
would then be copyrighted…. It seems probable that even a daily 
newspaper could thus be copyrighted day by day at a cost of $365 per 
year, so as to protect all its original material of substantial literary value.  
A daily Price-List of the New York Cotton Exchange was so entered day 
by day for some time, but the question of maintaining such a copyright 
162 Id. at 150.
163 Id. (citing Stealing the News, 38 Nation 159 (Feb. 21, 1884)).  
164
 Vaidhyanathan, supra n. 80, at 54.
165
 R.R. Bowker, Copyright: Its Law and Its Literature 13 (The Publishers’ Weekly 1886, reprinted Fred B. 
Rothman & Co. 1996) [hereinafter Bowker].
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seems never to have been tested in court.  The New York Sun copyrights 
its Sunday cable letter separately.166
Bowker did discuss some foreign precedents that supported his argument, 
notwithstanding the fact that “the word ‘newspaper’ does not occur in the definitions of 
the Act.”   
When the London Times’s memoir of Beaconsfield was reprinted as a 
penny pamphlet, the Times brought suit as a matter of common-law right, 
but the judge held that a newspaper was copyrightable under the statute, 
and therefore a common-law suit could not hold.  It was held by Mr. 
Justice Molesworth, in Melbourne, Australia, that a newspaper proprietor 
had copyright in special news telegrams, and another paper was enjoined 
from using them.”167
In any event, one further attempt to secure legislative recognition of the 
newspaper copyright failed in 1899, and Cloud indicates it was even less successful than 
Watterson’s 1884 campaign.168  Newspapers would not be explicitly mentioned in the 
copyright statute until the 1909 revision, and then only in the most matter-of-fact way. By 
then, however, the transformation of journalism from a public service to the manufacture 
of product had been largely completed; Congress was merely acknowledging a fait 
accompli: the propertization of news.
D.  The 1909 Copyright Act 
Before 1909, the only statutory provision in force that could have been construed 
as relating to the copyright of newspapers was Sec. 11 of the Act of March 3, 1891, 
which provided:
166 Id. But see Tribune Co. v. Associated Press, 116 F. 126 (N.D. Ill. 1900) (“It is at least questionable 
whether a copyright can [by registration and deposit] be secured for a newspaper.”)
167 Bowker, supra n. 165, at 13.
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That for the purpose of this act each volume of a book in two or more volumes, 
when such volumes are published separately and the first one shall not have been 
issued before this act shall take effect, and each number of a periodical shall be 
considered an independent publication, subject to the form of copyright as 
above.169
The word “newspaper” first appears in Sec. 5 of the 1909 revision of the 
copyright act:
“Sec. 5.  That the application for registration shall specify to which of the 
following classes the work in which copyright is claimed belongs:
* * *
“b.  Periodicals, including newspapers[.]”170
The House Report171 accompanying the new legislation saw no particular 
significance in adding the term “newspapers.”  Section 5, it said, “refers solely to a 
classification made for the convenience of the copyright office and those applying for 
copyrights.”172  Even more striking is the fact that the report of the Copyright Committee 
of the American Newspaper Publishers Association does not even mention it.173
168
 Cloud, supra n. 108, at 155.
169
 Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 1106, § 11 (noted in S. Rpt. 59-6187 at 11 (Feb. 5, 
1907)).
170
 Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1076, § 5.
171
 H.Rpt. 60-2222 (Feb. 22, 1909).
172 Id. at 10.
173 Statement of A.N.P.A. Copyright Committee Regarding Photographic Copyright Legislation Enacted by 
the Sixtieth Congress, American Newspaper Publishers Association [hereinafter ANPA] Bulletin No. 1969, 
“B” Special (March 20, 1909) (pp.205-207 of 1909 bound volume).
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The ANPA’s Copyright Committee was appointed in February 1905 “to act for 
the Association in consideration of the copyright laws and the newspaper publishers [sic] 
interest in them.”  
There will probably be a general convention within the next few months on 
copyrights and trade marks, and it is the purpose of the Association to be 
represented in that convention by members of that committee.  In the meantime, 
we ask any member who has any suggestion to make in reference to changes or 
additions to the copyright law to forward such suggestions to the New York office 
of the Association.174
The committee was chaired by Theodore W. Noyes of the Washington Star and 
included Louis M. Duvall of the Baltimore News and John Stewart Bryan of the 
Richmond Times-Dispatch.175  Neither Noyes nor Duvall were able to attend the “general 
convention,” which was held in New York on May 31, so Bryan and XXXX Seitz of the 
New York World represented ANPA.176  The committee’s report is sketchy, to say the 
least, but it appears that ANPA put in another futile word for protecting telegraphic news 
items for some brief term of days or hours.177  Nor was any such provision to be 
considered by the Library of Congress Copyright conference that convened in March 
1906,178 and none was ever enacted into law.
174
 ANPA Bulletin No. 1282, § B, at 2, May 5, 1905 (p. 148 of 1905 bound volume).  The 
annual meeting at which the committee was appointed was held February 21-23, 1905, at 
the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City.  ANPA Bulletin 1251, § B, at 1, Jan. 26, 
1905 (p. 23 of 1905 bound volume).
175
 ANPA Bulletin No. 1282, § B, at 2, May 5, 1905 (p. 148 of 1905 bound volume).  
176 Copyright Conference, ANPA Bulletin No. 1296, § B, at 1, June 3, 1905 (p. 213 of 
1905 bound volume).
177 Id. (“Mr. Bryan called attention to the provision protecting special telegrams in Australia and South 
Africa and a request was made that some such provision be incorporated in the forthcoming codification of 
the Copyright laws.”) 
178 Legislative History of the 1909 Copyright Act vol.5, M17 (E. Fulton Brylawski and Abe Goldman eds., 
Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1976).
40
But the primary focus of the ANPA representatives was protecting their 
membership from what the they viewed as excessive penalties for newspapers’ violations 
of photographers’ copyrights.179 That issue would preoccupy the Copyright Committee 
throughout the runup to the 1909 act.  In 1907, for example, ANPA explained that the 
committee “was appointed as a result of dissatisfaction with the existing law and 
apprehension of new and more objectionable legislation in respect to the reproduction by 
newspapers of copyrighted photographs.”180
The object of ANPA’s attention was a provision of the existing 1895 Copyright 
Act that established heavy penalties for infringement of photographic copyrights, 
including both injunctive relief and damages plus fines up to $10,000181  and a proposal 
to add criminal penalties for willful infringement.182  In its Bulletin, ANPA published the 
committee’s legal and practical arguments against such harsh treatment, urging language 
to provide “that the reproduction of a photograph in any newspaper by the process known 
as stereotyping shall not be construed as an infringement of the copyright of such 
photograph.”183  At the very least, the committee argued, the penalties for such 
infringement should be reduced to an amount commensurate with lost royalties, rather 
than a punitive assessment per copy made.184  The committee also urged the adoption of a 
179 Id. (“Mr. Seitz protested against any change in the Photographic Copyright law which 
was amended in the interest of the A.N.P.A. some years ago.  There was a disposition on 
the part of the Photographers to do this and restore old conditions.”)
180
 ANPA Bulletin No. 1581, § “B” Special, at 1 (Feb. 20, 1907) (p. 85 of the 1907 bound volume).
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 R.S. § 4965 as amended by the Act of March 2, 1895.  [see if you can get a better cite]
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 ANPA Bulletin No. 1581, § “B” Special, at 2 (Feb. 20, 1907) (p. 86 of the 1907 bound volume).
183 Id. at 4 (p. 88 of the 1907 bound volume).
184 Id. at 5 (p. 89 of the 1907 bound volume).
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conspicuous copyright notice requirement for photographs185 and exemption from or 
elimination of criminal penalties for infringement.186
In making its case, the ANPA referred to photographs in language reminiscent of 
that used by Justice Thompson in rejecting copyright protection for newspapers,187
including “purely mechanical” and “unintellectual.”188  It also argued that reproduction of 
photographs in newspapers actually increased their value to photographers189 – an 
argument that would be rejected again many years later by courts reviewing the copyright 
implications of music file sharing.190
In the end, Congress largely obliged the newspapers.  “As a result of the efforts of 
this committee, legislation affecting copyrights enacted in the closing hours of the 
sixtieth Congress assumed a form on this point which eliminated or modified the new 
legislative propositions most menacing to the newspaper publishing interests, and in 
important respects distinctly improved the existing law.”191  After 1909, newspapers were 
185 Id. at 6 (p. 90 of the 1907 bound volume).
186 Id. at 7 (p. 91 of the 1907 bound volume).
187 See infra n. 146 and accompanying text.
188 ANPA Bulletin No. 1581, § “B” Special, at 7 (Feb. 20, 1907) (p. 91 of the 1907 bound volume).
189 Id. at 5 (p. 89 of the 1907 bound volume).
190 See A&M Records v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (endorsing trial court’s rejection 
of expert testimony that “Napster is beneficial to the music industry because MP3 music file-sharing 
stimulates more audio CD sales than it displaces.”), and UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.com, Inc., 92 F. 
Supp. 2d 349, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (rejecting defendant’s argument that its “activities can only enhance 
plaintiffs’ sales, since subscribes cannot gain access to particular recordings made available by MP3.com 
unless they have already “purchased” (actually or purportedly), or agreed to purchase, their own CD copies 
of those recordings.”) 
191 Statement of A.N.P.A. Copyright Committee Regarding Photographic Copyright 
Legislation Enacted by the Sixtieth Congress, American Newspaper Publishers 
Association [hereinafter ANPA] Bulletin No. 1969, “B” Special. at 1 (March 20, 1909) 
(pp.205-207 of 1909 bound volume).
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not only explicitly protected by the federal copyright statute,192 their publishers had 
become successful players in the game, that is, the inter-industry negotiation process that 
has accompanied all major 20th Century revisions to the Copyright Act,  through which 
copyright winners and losers are chosen.193
E. Copyright Doctrine Today 
Most published journalism is treated like any other literary property under 
contemporary copyright doctrine, that is, fully protected for the life of the author plus 70 
years (or 95 years in the case of corporate authors).194   In theory at least, the “news of the 
day” lies outside the scope of copyright protection under the so-called fact-expression 
dichotomy,195 and, just as theoretically, news gets more sympathetic treatment under the 
fair use doctrine.196  This section will examine today’s copyright doctrine with respect to 
journalism and the news, both in the United States and abroad.
1.  Fact-Expression Dichotomy
By the 1880s, most courts had recognized that individual newspaper articles and 
illustrations generally qualified for copyright protection as literary works,197 although the 
192
 Notwithstanding the 1909 act’s minimizing the importance of “including newspapers” language in 
Section 5b, see infra n. 170, the U.S. Supreme Court took particular notice of that language in 
distinguishing the 1909 act from the acts of 1790 and 1802.  INS v. AP, 248 U.S. 215, 234 (1918).
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 For a general description of the “game,” see Jessica Litman, Digital Copyright 35-69 (Prometheus 
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194 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2003).
195 Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991).
196 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2003).
197See, e.g., Sarony v. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co., 17 F. 591, 592 (S.D. N.Y. 1883) (upholding the 
constitutionality of legislation extending copyright protection to photographs), and Harper v. Shoppell, 26 
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scope of protection in those early cases typically excluded advertisements.198  But the 
news contained in the newspaper articles has always remained outside copyright 
protection.  The invention in 1881 of a telegraphic “ticker,” which printed out news on a 
paper tape, gave rise to some of the earlier cases.199  Although many were essentially 
appropriation cases,200 the copyright issue was discussed at length in National Telegraph 
News Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co.201
Although this, too, is fundamentally an appropriation case, the defendant National 
Telegraph argued that the news carried on Western Union’s ticker – including stock 
prices, sports scores, and other information – was unprotected against appropriation 
unless protected by copyright law.202  If it were the proper subject matter for statutory 
copyright (which Western Union had not sought), Western Union’s failure to meet the 
deposit requirement would eviscerate any such protection.  And if protectable under the 
common law, the appearance of the printed tape would constitute publication and 
effectively dedicate the news to the public.203
F. 519, 519-20 (S.D. N.Y. 1886) (“The plaintiffs might have copyrighted the cut as an independent subject 
of copyright. … So, also, they could have copyrighted each poem or song or editorial composition of their 
newspaper.”)
198 See, e.g., Mutual Advertising Co. v. Refo, 76 F. 961, 963 (D. S.C. 1896), and Mott Iron Works v. Clow,
82 F. 316, 321 (7th Cir. 1897).
199 Natl. Tel. News Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 295 (7th Cir. 1902).
200 See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of City of Chi. V. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250 (holding that 
commodity price quotations were property, akin to trade secrets, entitled to protection from theft); accord
Hunt v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 205 U.S. 322 (1907).
201 See infra n. 199.
202 Natl. Tel., 119 F. at 296.
203 Id. at 295-96.
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The court ultimately concluded that National Telegraph had been properly 
enjoined from appropriating Western Union’s property, but it rejected any notion that the 
ticker reports were protected by copyright law.204  “We are of the opinion that the printed 
tape would not be copyrightable,” the court said, “even if the practical difficulties were 
out of the way.”205 Acknowledging that the scope of copyright protection had expanded 
as new conditions arose, so that nothing is excluded that evinces “the mind of a creator or 
originator,” the court nevertheless drew the line “at the point where authorship proper 
ends, and mere annals begin.” 206
It would be both inequitable and impracticable to give copyright to every 
printed article.  Much of current publication – in fact the greater portion –
is nothing beyond the mere notation of events transpiring, which, if 
transpiring at all, are accessible by all.  It is inconceivable that the 
copyright grant of the constitution, and the statutes in pursuance thereof, 
were meant to give a monopoly of narrative to him, who, putting the bare 
recital of events in print, went through the routine formulae of the 
copyright statute.207
The court conceded that the results of a race could be narrated with “creative 
imagination” and that market results could form the basis of a useful book or original 
article.  “But the printed tape under consideration ... is nothing more or less than the 
transmission by electricity, over long distances, of what a spectator of the event, 
occupying a fortunate position to see or hear, would have communicated by word of 
204 Id. at 301.
205 Id. at 296.
206 Id. at 297.
207 Id.
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mouth, to his less fortunate neighbor.  It is an exchange merely, over wider area, of 
ordinary sightseeing.”208
Finally, the court said, whatever value the tape might have “lasts literally for an 
hour, and is in the wastebasket when the hour has passed.”209  It is not the inherent value 
of the news that matters to the patron, but the fact that the news reached the patron more 
quickly than it would by other means.  It is this service that gives the tape its commercial 
value, “not Authorship, nor the work of the Publisher.”210
Oh, but what a service!  After thoroughly denigrating the value of news as 
literature, the court waxes positively poetic about what we take for granted as the 
fundamental purpose, value and conceit of today’s electronic journalism:
…that modern enterprise – one of the distinctive achievements of our day 
– which, combining the genius and the accumulations of men, with the 
forces of electricity, combs the earth’s surface, each day, for what the day 
has brought forth, that whatever befalls the sons of men shall come, almost 
instantaneously, into the consciousness of mankind.  Thus, a gun thunders 
in a harbor on the other side of the earth; before its reverberations have 
ceased, the moral sequence of the event has taken root in every civilized 
quarter of the earth.  Famine arises in India to begin its grim march; it has 
gotten but little under way until a counter army – the unfailing 
benevolence of human kind – has been mustered from America to Russia.    
On an isolated island, and without premonition, a mountain claps its black 
hands upon the population of a city; almost before a ship in the harbor, 
with tidings of the catastrophe, could have set sail, relief ships from the 
harbors of Christendom are under way.  By such agencies as these, the 
world is made to face itself unceasingly in the glass, and is put to those 
tests that bring increasing helpfulness and beauty into the heart of our 
race.211
208 Id. at 298.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 298-99.
211 Id. at 300.
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Lest such a service be “outlawed” by denying it the protection of the courts 
against the “inroads of the parasite,” the court went on to affirm the lower court’s 
injunction against National Telegraph.212  Without such protection, the court said, “but 
one result could follow – the gathering and distributing of news, as a business enterprise, 
would cease altogether. … The parasite that killed, would itself be killed, and the public
would be left without any service at any price.”213
The reasoning of National Telegraph was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court 
sixteen years later in International News Service v. Associated Press, 214 albeit without 
the rhetorical flourishes.  As in the earlier case, the question before the court was whether 
the defendant below could lawfully appropriate for resale news from bulletins issued by 
AP or published in AP member newspapers.  As in the earlier case, the news was not 
protected by copyright, although the product more closely resembled today’s finished 
news stories than the ticker tape produced by Western Union.  
For tactical reasons, both parties insisted that AP’s material was not subject to 
copyright.  AP argued that securing copyright for its dispatches was impractical and, 
anyway, those dispatches were beyond the scope of the copyright act.  Its property 
interest lay exclusively in protecting its business from free-riders.215  INS agreed that 
AP’s news lacked copyright protection, and like National Telegraph before it, argued that 
absent compliance with the formalities of copyright, publication extinguished any 
property right in the material.  The holding below, that AP and its members retain a 
212 Id. at 301.
213 Id. at 296.
214
 248 U.S. 215, 237 (1918).
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property right in the news until published by each member, is a “mere conclusion, 
unsupported by reason.”216
The Court, however, was not taken in by these tactical positions.  It recognized 
that the Copyright Act was now much broader after 1909 than it was when Clayton v. 
Stone217 was decided.
[The act] provides that the works for which copyright may be secured 
shall include “all the writings of an author,” and specifically mentions 
“periodicals, including newspapers.” [citations omitted] Evidently this 
admits to copyright a contribution to a newspaper, notwithstanding that it 
may also convey news; and such is the practice of the copyright office, as 
the newspapers of the day bear witness.218
Even so, the Court said, the “news element – the information respecting current 
events contained in the literary production – is not the creation of the writer, but is a 
report of matters that ordinarily are publici juris; it is the history of the day.”219  The 
framers, in empowering Congress to enact copyright laws, could not have intended “to 
confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a historic even the exclusive 
right for any period to spread the knowledge of it.”220
That would remain the definitive statement of the fact/expression dichotomy as it 
relates to news to this day, 221 although the rest of the Court’s tortured reasoning –
216
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separating AP’s property interest in the news from its commercial interest in making the 
news “known to the world” before its competitors, and holding that INS had appropriated 
the latter – has been the subject of intense criticism.222  The criticism began implicitly in 
the concurring opinion of Justice Holmes223 and explicitly in the dissent of Justice 
Brandeis224 – both of which will inform our analysis below.  We proceed first to examine 
the second copyright doctrine that purports to protect the public interest in news from 
monopolization by the media:  fair use.  
2.  Fair Use
The application of fair use doctrine to newspapers goes at least as far back as 
Harper v. Shoppell, 225 where the court pointed out that the copyright in a book – here, the 
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright vol. 1 § 2.11 (David Nimmer, rev. author, Matthew 
Bender 2003) [hereinafter Nimmer on Copyright].  Specifically, the 1976 Act reads:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship 
extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, 
concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is 
described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work. 
17 U.S.C. 102(b).
222 See, e.g., Gary Myers, The Restatement’s Rejection of the Misappropriation Tort: A Victory for the 
Public Domain, 47 S.C. L. Rev. 673 (1996) (“the tort of misappropriation threatens the existence of a well 
defined ‘public domain’ of information to which the public can freely obtain access”) [hereinafter Myers], 
and Leo J. Raskind, The Misappropriation Doctrine as a Competitive Norm of Intellectual Property Law, 
75 Minn. L. Rev. 875 (1991) (application of the misappropriation doctrine should be limited to “the 
relatively rare instances when traditional intellectual property principles lead to perverse and unacceptable 
outcomes”).  But see Douglas G. Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property and the Legacy of International 
News Service v. Associated Press, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 411 (1983) (“the doctrine has flourished in the state 
courts without impeding the flow of information”).  
223
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“book” in question was Harper’s Illustrated Newspaper – is “not always invaded by 
reproducing a part of the work.”
Where portions are extracted and published in a book or newspaper by 
another, the question whether there has been piracy depends upon the 
extent and character of his use of them.  Thus it is not piracy for a 
reviewer or commentator to make use of portions of a copyrighted work 
for the purposes of fair exposition or reasonable criticism. … A test 
frequently applied is whether the extracts, as used, are likely to injure the 
sales of the original work. [citations omitted]226
But for some of the language omitted here concerning the “appropriation 
substantially of the labors of the original author,”227 this 1886 exposition of the fair use 
doctrine might well have been used a century later when the Supreme Court, in another 
Harper case, gave the fair use doctrine its definitive interpretation.  In so doing, the Court 
exposed the inadequacy of both the fact-expression dichotomy and the fair use doctrine in 
protecting the public’s interest in news from the media companies that generate it.
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, Inc.,228 the Supreme 
Court denied the protection of the fair use doctrine to a 2,250-word magazine article 
concerning President Gerald Ford’s pardon of President Richard Nixon.229  The article 
was based on Ford’s still-unpublished memoirs, which had been “leaked” to The Nation
magazine,230 and included 300 to 400 words taken verbatim from the manuscript.231 The 
226 Id.
227 Id.  The notion that the original author’s “sweat of the brow” had a bearing on the degree of protection 
afforded was definitively quashed in Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 354 
(1991).
228
 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
229 Id. at 543.
230 Id.
231 Id. at 548.
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Nation’s article “scooped” a 7,500-word excerpt that Time Magazine was to publish 
under license from Ford’s publisher, Harper & Row, and Time reneged on $12,500 of the 
$25,000 license fee.232
Unquestionably, the public had an extraordinary interest in the “facts” embodied 
in Ford’s memoirs.  Had The Nation refrained from using Ford’s actual expression, 
Harper would have had no recourse to copyright law for redress.233   Other causes of 
action might have been invoked, such as tortious interference with contract, although that 
might well have been trumped by the public interest in the information.234
But The Nation argued that the public also had a legitimate interest in Ford’s 
actual expression, and, apparently in The Nation’s view, 300-400 words from a book-
length manuscript were necessary to vindicate that interest.  In particular, The Nation
argued that the public’s interest in hearing Ford’s reasons for pardoning Nixon – in 
Ford’s own words – outweighed Ford’s right to control first publication of his memoirs.   
“[T]he precise manner in which [Ford] expressed himself [were] as newsworthy as what 
he had to say.”235
The Court acknowledged that some of Ford’s expression was “so integral to the 
idea expressed as to be inseparable from it,” but found that The Nation used more 
232 Id. at 543.
233 Id. at 557 (paraphrasing Iowa St. U. Research Found. v. Am. Broad Cos., 621 F.2d 57, 61 (1980): 
“[Respondent] possessed an unfettered right to use any factual information revealed in [the memoirs] for 
the purpose of enlightening its audience….”).
234 See Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 767(d) cmt. f  (1979).
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 471 U.S. at 556.
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expression than necessary to convey those ideas.236  More importantly, the Court declined 
to find what it described as a “public figure exception” to copyright.  “Whether verbatim 
copying from a public figure’s manuscript in a given case is or is not fair use must be 
judged according to the traditional equities of fair use.”237 Accordingly, the Court stepped 
through the four prongs of the fair use doctrine.  
On the first, “Purpose of the Use,” the Court acknowledged that the article was 
“news reporting,” however that might be defined, but found the “crux” of the matter in 
whether the magazine stood to profit from the exploiting the copyrighted material without 
paying the customary price.238  The Court seemed particularly incensed by the 
magazine’s use of a “purloined manuscript” with the intent to “scoop” a competitor who 
fairly bid for the rights.239  If “news reporting” is a favored purpose under fair use 
analysis, it seemed to weigh very lightly against The Nation’s perceived commercial 
interests in publication. 
On the second prong, “Nature of the Copyrighted Work,” the Court again 
conceded that the memoirs fell into a fair use-favored category, historical narrative or 
autobiography.240  But whatever advantage that might have bestowed was quickly 
negated.  The Court found the fact that a work is unpublished “is a critical element of its 
‘nature’” and the “scope of fair use is narrower with respect to unpublished works.”241
236 Id. at 563.
237 Id. at 560.
238 Id. at 562.
239 Id. at 562-63.
240 Id. at 563.
241 Id. at 564.
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The Court added that The Nation’s “clandestine publication…. was hastily patched
together and contained ‘a number of inaccuracies,’”242 but did not say what that had to do 
with the nature of the original work.    
On the third prong, “Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used,” the Court 
was far less concerned with the math than with the “qualitative value of the copied 
material.”243  “In view of the expressive value of the excerpts and their key role in he 
infringing work, we cannot agree with the Second Circuit that the ‘magazine took a 
meager, indeed an infinitesimal amount of Ford’s original language.’”244
Finally, the Court said the fourth prong of the fair use analysis, “Effect on the 
Market,” was “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”245 Time’s
refusal to pay the remaining $12,500 under its license agreement gave Harper & Row a 
slam dunk.  “Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence 
of actual damage,” the Court said.246  Even if the economic damage were not so obvious, 
“to negate fair use, one need only show that if the challenged use ‘should become 
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work.’”247
In Harper & Row, the Supreme Court denied a bona fide news magazine the 
latitude to use 300 or 400 words written by a President of the United States on a story of 
surpassing public importance.  One gets the sense that the step-by- step fair use analysis 
242 Id.
243 Id. at 566.
244
 Id.  (quoting Harper & Row Publ. Co., 723 F.2d at 209).
245
 471 U.S. at 566.
246 Id. at 567.
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was merely an afterthought, that the case was largely decided on the ground that Ford 
was deprived of first publication rights, influenced by the unsavory aspects of “leaks” and 
“scoops,” and perhaps by the justices’ thoughts about their own memoirs.  More 
charitably, Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, sees the majority succumbing to the 
“temptation to find copyright violation based on a minimal use of literary form in order to 
provide compensation for the appropriation of information from a work of history.”248
Joined by Justices White and Marshall, Brennan’s dissent answers the majority 
analysis prong for prong and concludes that “the Court’s exceedingly narrow approach to 
fair use permits Harper & Row to monopolize information.”249  Quoting Justice 
Brandeis’s dissent in INS v. AP, which warned of an “an important extension of property 
rights and a corresponding curtailment in the free use of knowledge and of ideas,”250
Brennan went on to offer what he believed to be the essential justification for finding fair 
use in this case:
The Court has perhaps advanced the ability of the historian – or at least the 
public official who has recently left office – to capture the full economic 
value of information in his or her possession.  But the Court does so only 
by risking the robust debate of public issues that is the ‘essence of self-
government.’  The Nation was providing the grist for that robust debate.  
The Court imposes liability upon The Nation for no other reason than that 
The Nation succeeded in being the first to provide certain information to 
the public.251
247 Id. at 568 (quoting Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S.  417, 451 (1984)).
248
 471 U.S. at 590 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
249 Id. at 605.
250 Id. (quoting INS v. AP, 248 U.S. at 263, Brandeis, J., dissenting).
251
 471 U.S. at 605.
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That Brennan’s view did not prevail in this case demonstrates the inadequacy of  
both the fact-expression dichotomy and fair use, even in combination, to protect the 
public’s interest in news.  Few litigated examples better represent the “wedding of 
expression and idea” than the Ford memoirs,252 and The Nation’s “use” of that expression 
was as much a journalistic imperative as a commercial coup.  If Brennan’s argument did 
not make the case for fair use, then it provides a succinct rationale for removing news 
from the stifling embrace of the copyright regime.
Part III –Where shall we go?
In some ways, Harper & Row is the hard case that makes bad law.  First 
publication rights have a moral foundation beyond the economic underpinnings of 
American copyright law.253  President Ford arguably deserved the opportunity to revise 
his manuscript or reconsider its release altogether, although nothing of that sort appeared 
to be a factor in the case.254  As suggested above, the unpublished nature of the Ford 
memoir may well have been the dispositive factor in this case. 
Yet, 16 years later, the Supreme Court held that a reporter who broadcast, in 
violation of federal law, purloined speech that was never meant to be published was 
252 See Nimmer on Copyright, supra n. 221, vol. 1, § 1.10[c][2]. 
253
 The moral right of publication (droit de divulgation) includes both the right of the author to decide 
whether and when the work is to be published and the right to withdraw the work after publication.  
Stephen M. Stewart, International Copyright and Neighboring Rights § 4.40, 73 (2d ed.,  Butterworths 
1989) [hereinafter Stewart].  Unlike the other three French moral rights, the right of publication was not 
incorporated into the Berne convention.  Id. See also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 551, nn. 4-5.) 
254
 471 U.S. at 554 (“We also find unpersuasive respondents' argument that fair use may be made of a soon-
to-be-published manuscript on the ground that the author has demonstrated he has no interest in 
nonpublication.”).
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 fully protected by the First Amendment because the speech was publicly important.  In 
Bartnicki v. Vopper,255 the speech in question had little or no commercial value; the 
federal statute in question sought to protect a privacy interest, rather than an economic 
interest.  Otherwise, there is no principled difference between the two cases.256  If Harper 
& Row is still good law, then commercial interests outweigh not only the public’s interest 
in newsworthy information, but also the personal privacy interests of the speaker.
I have argued elsewhere that the public’s right to newsworthy information ought 
to outweigh copyright and suggested any number of mechanisms that might have freed 
the Ford memoir. 257  In this piece, however, I am not really concerned about information 
of such surpassing public importance.  Nor am I interested in exploring further the 
peculiar case of unpublished news.  Here, my concern is the so-called “ownership” of 
published or broadcast news stories – original works of authorship that relate the “news 
of the day” to the public.  
In my view, such works should be removed entirely from the realm of copyright 
protection, and their authors’ interest in them protected by mechanisms that better 
safeguard the public’s interest in the widest possible dissemination.  Specifically, I would 
permit the republication or rebroadcast, by any third party, of any published or broadcast 
work commonly understood to be a news story or identified as such by its author after an 
embargo of twenty-four hours or, if the regular frequency of the original publication is 
255
 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
256
 One could make the case that, in Bartnicki, the information in question would never have been made 
public but for the violation, whereas, in Harper & Row, the public would have received the information 
soon enough.  Of course, that’s having one’s cake and eating it, too.   There is an obvious contradiction in 
arguing that one’s first publication rights – including the right to withhold publication – are sacrosanct, 
unless one does not intend to publish.      
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greater than twenty-four hours, after the next regular issue is published.  As noted above, 
such an embargo period was contemplated as part of early copyright law. 258
Where the subsequent use is not directly competitive, because the republished 
product serves a different purpose or market,259 the embargo period would be deemed 
waived.  Such republication or rebroadcast would also be subject to the moral rights of 
attribution and integrity as defined herein.260  Publishers and broadcasters could bring an 
action for unfair competition if the embargo is broken, and reporters and producers could 
enforce their moral rights at any time.  
By denying copyright protection for news, such a regime would reduce the 
incentive for major media companies to treat news stories as commodities valued only for 
their propensity to attract readers and viewers who, in turn, can be packaged and sold to 
advertisers.  The race to the bottom would end.  At the same time, this proposal would 
protect all of the important interests involved in the news-producing process, including 
the public’s right to know, the reporter’s professional reputation, and most of the 
publisher’s or broadcaster’s return on investment.  
257
 Eric B. Easton, Public Importance:  Balancing Proprietary Interests and the Right to Know, 21 Cardozo 
Arts & Ent. L.J. 139, 184-192 (2003).
258 See supra nn. 157-161 and accompanying text. 
259
 This exception to the embargo recognizes positive value of what has been called a “transformative use” 
in the context of fair use analysis.  As Judge Leval has said,
To the extent the secondary work merely exhibits the primary copyrighted work, it is 
powerfully disfavored by [the “purpose and character of the use”] factor [in fair use 
analysis]. To the extent, however, that the quoted passages are a raw material utilized for 
a new intellectual creation of the fair users – to the extent this is a creative or productive 
use – it is the type of activity intended to benefit from the fair use doctrine for the 
intellectual enrichment of society.
Pierre Leval, Fair Use or Foul?  The 19th Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 36 J. Copy. Socy. 168, [need 
pinpoint cite] (1989).     
260 See infra nn. 263-70 and accompanying text.
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Moreover, the proposed rule fully comports with international standards. 
Legislation embodying the central principles of this proposal is authorized by Article 
10bis of the Berne Convention.  Specifically, the contemplated acts would allow the 
“reproduction by the press, the broadcasting or the communication to the public by wire 
of articles published in newspapers or periodicals on current economic, political or 
religious topics, and of broadcast works of the same character”261 unless expressly 
forbidden by the author.  Indeed, the 1948 Brussels text provided for the free use of news 
stories unless prohibited by national legislation.262
As in this proposal, the Berne Convention provides that the source must always be 
clearly indicated whenever news is reproduced in this way.263   This, Stephen M. Stewart 
says, emphasizes the continuing respect for the author’s moral rights (droit moral) even 
when economic rights are limited.264  Moral rights may be a largely alien concept in this 
country,  but this right of attribution  (droit de paternité)  seemed perfectly appropriate to 
Justice Holmes as the solution to International News Service’s appropriation of 
Associated Press stories.265  Moreover, it seems entirely compatible with the regard in 
which American bylines are held.266
261 Berne Convention, supra n. 8, art. 10bis.
262
 Stewart, supra n. 253, § 5.60(a), 137 (citing the Brussels Act of 1948, art. 9(2)).
263 Berne Convention, supra n. 8, art. 10bis.
264
 Stewart, supra n. 253, § 5.60(e), 137.
265
 248 U.S. at 248 (Holmes, J., concurring).
266
 Stewart defines the right of paternity as including “(i) the right to demand that the author’s name appears 
in an appropriate place on all copies of the work and to claim authorship of it at all times; (ii) conversely, 
the right to prevent all others from claiming authorship of the work; (iii) the right to prevent the use of his 
name by someone else in connection with that other person’s work.”  Stewart, supra n. 253, § 4.41, 73.
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The byline is something more than merely an acknowledgement of authorship; it 
is (or should be) a personal guarantee of good faith from reporter to reader.  Byline 
“strikes,” where reporters withhold their bylines in protest, often arise during contract 
negotiations,267 but may also be used to publicly protest editorial policies or practices 
with which the reporters disagree.268
In a section entitled “Employee Integrity,” the Newspaper Guild’s Model 
Contract provides that “An employee's byline or credit line shall not be used over the 
employee's protest.”269   If reporters hope to win such recognition from their own 
publishers, surely no less should be expected from other publishers who use the reporters’ 
work for free.  Under my proposal, use of another news outlet’s story would require 
attribution to both the reporter or producer and the publisher or broadcaster.
 This provision of the Guild model contract also implicates the moral right of 
integrity (droit de respect de l’oeuvre) by requiring that substantive changes in material 
submitted shall be brought to the employee's attention before publication.  Additionally, 
reporters operating under such a contract may “not be required to write, process or 
prepare anything for publication in such a way as to distort any facts or to create an 
267 See, e.g., A Sun Staff Writer, In Union Action, Baltimore Sun Journalists Withhold Bylines, Balt. Sun 
(June 16, 2003) (available in LEXIS, News library, News, All file); Frank Ahrens, 'Byline Strike' Begins at 
Post; Guild Calls for 5-Day Action as Contract Talks Hit Standstill Over Union-Membership Rules, Wash. 
Post E1 (Oct. 1, 2002);  From Staff and News Services, Byline Strike Begins Today at Portland Papers, 
Portland Press Herald 6D (July 14, 2001).
268 See, e.g., Antonia Zerbisias, Bylines More Than Just a Name, Toronto Star C6 (Oct. 28, 2002); Lori 
Robinson, No One’s Laughing, Am. Journ. R. 8 (April 2000) (discussing byline strike protesting 
suspension of Toledo Blade  reporter for parody cartoon); TNG Canada Condemns CanWest Global for 
Latest Censorship Incident, Can. NewsWire (Oct. 7, 2002) (describing byline strike called to protest 
“watering down” of story covering speech critical of newspaper’s parent publishing company).
269
 The Newspaper Guild, U.S. Model Contract, http://www.newsguild.org/barg/display. php?storyID=146
(accessed Oct. 27, 2003).
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impression which the employee knows to be false.” 270  Again, I would impose similar 
limitations on any subsequent use of the original story.
Three serious concerns with this proposal remain to be discussed:  defining 
“news,” curtailing “free riders,” and preserving the incentive to produce quality 
journalism.  We consider each of these in turn.
A.  Defining the News
Obviously, the feasibility of this proposal requires a workable definition of 
“news.”  Resolving that question legislatively comes dangerously close to licensing and 
raises unnecessary constitutional issues.  Fortunately, “news” is usually defined as such 
by those who gather and disseminate it, and when a dispute does occur, the judicial 
inquiry need be no more challenging than the fair use analysis judges undertake now.271
The problem of defining news was recently cited by the Federal Communications 
Commission in adopting an anti-piracy mechanism for digital broadcast television.272
The FCC’s order requires consumer electronics manufacturers to limit the copies that can 
be made of any digital television programming in which broadcasters have inserted some 
identifying computer code called a “flag.”  The hardware manufacturers and various 
other commenters had urged FCC to prohibit use of the flag for news and public interest 
270 Id.
271
 Although the Harper & Row Court endorsed the view that “courts should be chary of deciding what is 
and what is not news,” 471 U.S. at 561 (citing Harper & Row Publ. Co. v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 
215 (2d Cir. 1983) (Meskill, J., dissenting)), it did not contradict the Second Circuit’s confident assertion 
that The Nation’s article “must be characterized as the reporting either of news or of recent history.” 723 
F.2d at 206-7. 
272 In re Digital Broadcast Content Protection, Rpt. & Order & Further NPRM, MB Docket 02-230 ¶ 38 
(F.C.C. Nov. 4, 2003).
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programming.273  The FCC agreed instead with the broadcasting and motion picture 
industries, which had argued, in part, that the prohibition would implicate FCC overview 
of content.274  Although I believe the implication is exaggerated, I am more comfortable 
273 Id.
274 Id.  Of course, I disagree with the content providers’ other arguments against prohibiting use of the flag 
with news and public interest programming, namely, that such programming “merits the same level of 
protection afforded to entertainment programming” and “to do otherwise could discourage its creation.”  Id.
Rather, I more closely, although not entirely, agree with the dissenting opinions in that case:
I dissent in part, first, because the Commission does not preclude 
the use of the flag for news or for content that is already in the public 
domain.  This means that even broadcasts of government meetings could 
be locked behind the flag.  Broadcasters are given the right to use the 
public’s airwaves in return for serving their communities.  The widest 
possible dissemination of news and information serves the best interests of 
the community.  We should therefore be promoting the widest possible 
dissemination of news and information consistent, of course, with the 
copyright laws.  And neither the FCC nor the broadcast flag should 
interfere with the free flow of non-copyrightable material.  As discussed 
above, this Order attempts to strike a balance between preserving 
consumers’ reasonable and flexible uses and permitting content providers 
a technological means to protect their copyright.  But on the scale of the 
public interest, we must accord great weight to enabling lawful consumer 
and educational use of content when we are talking about something that 
goes to the core of America’s public discourse and its civic dialogue.  I 
understand the arguments of those who caution that precluding the flag for 
news and information could entail some difficult and sensitive decisions 
about what constitutes news and public information and what does not.  
Even if we are confronted with some difficult decisions, I would rather 
attempt the difficult than deny the free flow of news and information the 
widest possible dissemination.
Id. (Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Approving in Part, Dissenting in Part).
Nor do I take lightly a government-required protection regime that could restrict 
the free flow of news or public affairs programming which is at the heart of public 
discourse in our society.  Our country has a long history of promoting widespread public 
access to broadcast television.  In return for the free use of the spectrum, broadcasters are 
expected to serve their local communities.  Consistent with copyright law, the wider the 
dissemination of news and public affairs programming, the better our communities and 
our democracy are served.  The lawful consumer and educational use of content for 
scholarship, commentary, criticism, teaching, research, or other socially beneficial 
purposes should not be hindered.  I see little threat to content creators from a parent e-
mailing to family members and friends a local television news clip of a son or daughter 
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leaving that determination to the courts on a case by case basis than to the legislative or
regulatory process.  
Certainly, the international copyright regime seems confident that news can be 
identified by the courts without too much difficulty.  Article 2(8) of the Berne 
Convention states that copyright protection “shall not apply to news of the day or to 
miscellaneous facts having the character of mere items of press information.”275  Nimmer 
suggests out that this language does not prohibit application of copyright protection to 
news stories, 276 and American copyright law now protects such stories within the limits 
allowed by the fact-expression dichotomy.277  Stewart notes that, under the Berne 
Convention, the line between unprotected news and “works” of journalism is to be drawn 
by the national courts.278
The problem of defining news may not be as significant as it first appears.  Since
the proposed regime would still protect the most important rights associated with true 
journalism, a rational media company would only litigate the issue in the unusual case 
receiving a community service award, or a teacher choosing to show his or her classroom 
a rebroadcast of a space shuttle launch using an Internet connection.
Id. (Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Approving in Part, Dissenting in Part).
275 Berne Convention, supra n. 8, art. 2(8).
276 Nimmer on Copyright, supra n. 221, § 2.11[B].
277 See Ga. TV Co. v. TV News Clips of Atlanta, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 939, 947-48 ( N.D. Ga. 1989). 
278
 Stewart, supra n. 253, § 5.55, 135.
The guideline for the courts is the general principle underlying the Convention that to 
constitute a work there must be a certain amount of creativity.  It is left to the national 
courts to decide in each case whether the news item in issue is “merely relating the facts 
in a dry and impersonal manner or constitutes a story related with a degree of 
originality.”  The degree of originality required may vary from country to country.  
Where standards of originality are high, e.g., in France, the laws of unfair competition 
may give a remedy where copyright does not, e.g., one press agency taking its reports 
from another one.
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where a work has substantial economic value over an extended period of time.  Such a 
work is not likely to be news anyway.
Still, I am prepared to leave the definition largely in the hands of the media 
itself.279  That programming that a publisher or broadcaster promotes as news will be 
unprotected except as described herein; programming for which traditional copyright is 
desired may not be described as news.280  At the very least, a modicum of  “truth in 
packaging” ought to emerge from this scheme.281
B.  Curtailing Free Riders
The notion that “free riding” on someone else’s effort for economic gain is wrong 
clearly predates INS v. AP,282 but that case is a good place to begin reexamining the 
contention that misappropriation is a significant problem in the news business that 
requires control through copyright law.  I believe it does not.  
Id.
279
 I note with interest that Professor Baker has also suggested giving legal weight to media decisions 
regarding their own publication choices.  In a discussion of confidentiality agreements between reporters 
and sources, Baker hypothesizes that common law doctrine could evolve to make such “contracts” 
unenforceable where they restrict disclosure of information needed to serve the public interest.  “To avoid 
content evaluation of the press’s publication decisions, its publication of the information could be taken as 
conclusive of whether the public is served.”  Baker, supra n. 65 at 60.
280
 And, in the case of broadcast programs involving political candidates, may not qualify as an exception 
under Section 315 of the Federal Communications Act, 42 U.S.C. 315(a) (2000).  Thus, a broadcaster 
would have the option of enforcing copyright for its political programming or providing equal on-air 
opportunities to opposing candidates.  Either way, the public would benefit.
281
 I do not think this approach requires a return to the copyright notice abandoned by the 1976 act in 
conformance with Berne requirements.  I am content to let the courts adjudicate the adequacy of notice 
through context one case at a time.  There may be some difficulty at the margins, but hard news should be 
readily identifiable for the most part.
282
 Judge Grosscup’s colorful opinion in Natl. Tel. News Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 119 F. 294, 296 
(7th Cir. 1902), compares the act of appropriating and reselling another’s wire service reports to that of a 
parasite ultimately destroying its host and leaving the public without any news service at all.
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Let us first consider what appears to be the principal rationale of INS v. AP: free 
riding constitutes unjust enrichment of the pirate at the expense of the entrepreneur.
[T]his defendant… admits that it is taking material that has been acquired 
by complainant as the result of organization and the expenditure of labor, 
skill, and money, and which is salable by complainant for money, and that 
defendant in appropriating it and selling it as its own is endeavoring to 
reap where it has not sown…. 283
Enrichment, yes.  But unjust?  We all derive some cost-free benefit from the 
labor, skill, and money of others.  Sir Isaac Newton famously stood “on the shoulders of 
giants” to see the scientific truths he discovered,284 and I got 23 free minutes at a parking 
meter today on someone else’s quarter.  We react viscerally against anyone (else) getting 
“something for nothing,” yet we have declined to protect facts, or even compilations of 
facts that required labor, skill, and money to produce, from appropriation.285  To be sure, 
copyright law protects original expression from appropriation, but not to prevent unjust 
enrichment.  If that were the motive behind copyright law, the Supreme Court would not 
have rejected the “sweat of the brow” doctrine.286
So, if free riding is a problem, it must be a function of unfair competition.  That 
is, the problem exists when – and only when – the republisher’s use of the original 
expression hurts the original publisher’s business out of all proportion to the republisher’s 
283
 248 U.S. at 239.  
284
 Generally attributed to Newton’s letter to Robert Hooke, dated Feb. 5, 1676, based on an aphorism from 
Robert Burton’s The Anatomy of Melancholy: “Pygmies placed on the shoulders of giants see more than 
the giants themselves.” Burton's source is said to be the 12th Century scholastic Bernard de Chartres, who 
reportedly wrote: “In comparison with the ancients we stand like dwarfs on the shoulders on giants.” 
Cosmic Baseball Association, http://www.cosmicbaseball.com/newton8.html (updated Nov. 24, 2003).  See 
also Myers, supra n. 222, at 681. 
285 Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
286 Id. at 359-60.
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investment or risk or creativity.  Put another way, where the republisher’s use has no 
adverse effect on the publisher’s business – as when the uses are not directly competitive 
– free riding should not be an issue.  One example might be websites that post copies of 
newspaper articles and solicits comments from their members. 287 Even where there is an 
adverse effect, it may be justified by the value added by republication.   Examples of such 
uses might include the video monitoring or “clipping” services that tape and may sell 
copies of broadcast news stories that feature their clients,288 or websites containing 
searchable databases of news stories from across the globe.289
The only realistic adverse effect of these examples might be an unfair competitive 
advantage for the republisher if, but only if, the original producer wanted to enter the 
same business.  Copyright law now recognizes the holder’s proprietary interest in  
prospective markets for her copyright material,290 but one may question whether that 
287 L. A. Times & Wash. Post v. Free Republic, No. 98-7840 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 1998).
288 See, e.g., CNN v. Video Monitoring Serv., Inc., 940 F. 2d 1471 (11th Cir. 1991), vacated, 949 F.2d 378 
(11th Cir. 1991), appeal dismissed, 959 F.2d 188 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (per curiam); Pacific & 
Southern Co. v. Carol Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1984), on remand, 618 F. Supp. 469 (N.D. Ga. 
1985), aff’d 792 F.2d 1013 (11th Cir. 1986).
289
 Such databases exist now, of course, but accessibility is limited by cost or purpose.  Both Lexis, 
http://www.lexis.com, and Westlaw, http://www.westlaw.com, maintain fee-for-access databases of 
licensed news stories from various print sources, while Vanderbilt University hosts a television news 
archive for educational uses, http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/, with fees ranging from $25 to $100 per half 
hour.  Internet search engines are constrained by the availability of self-archived stories; Google’s new 
“news” search engine focuses only on current news, http://news.google.com (all accessed Feb. 7, 2004).
290 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569(1994):
The fourth fair use factor is "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value 
of the copyrighted work." § 107(4). It requires courts to consider not only the extent of 
market harm caused by the particular actions of the alleged infringer, but also "whether 
unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant . . . would 
result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market" for the original. The 
enquiry "must take account not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the 
market for derivative works." (citations omitted)
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recognition is appropriate for news.  As long as sufficient incentive remains to ensure that 
the news is gathered in the first place, there is no reason to reduce competition in the 
dissemination of news and every reason to encourage it.  We return to the question of 
incentive shortly.   
  Before that, however, we must consider the case where the competition is direct 
and potentially damaging to the original producer, such as the cost-free, risk-free 
republication of wire service stories without attribution or added value that actually 
occurred in INS v. AP.291  The result, of course, was the Supreme Court’s endorsement of 
the misappropriation tort in such circumstances.  While the immediate application of the 
tort may have been reasonable, it was certainly poor public policy.
Criticism of the misappropriation tort abounds,292 and it has effectively been 
eliminated from the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition.293  Perhaps the most 
telling came from Justice Brandeis’s dissent in INS v. AP  itself: 
291
 This characterization of the situation in INS v. AP reflects the majority view in that case and, perhaps 
because that view prevailed, the conventional wisdom today.  In retrospect, Justice Brandeis, not 
surprisingly, may have had the clearer view.  Brandeis found nothing anticompetitive in INS’s taking:
The acts here complained of were not done for the purpose of injuring the business of the 
Associated Press.  Their purpose was not even to divert its trade, or to put it at a 
disadvantage by lessening defendant’s necessary expenses.  The purpose was merely to 
supply subscribers o the International news Service promptly with all available news. … 
Furthermore, the protection to these Associated Press members [afforded by the 
injunction] consists merely in denying to other papers the right to use, as news, 
information which, by authority of all concerned, had theretofore been given to the public 
by some of those who joined in gathering it; and to which the law denies the attributes of 
property.
248 U.S. at 261 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
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The general rule of law is, that the noblest of human productions –
knowledge, truths ascertained, conceptions, and ideas – become, after 
voluntary communication to others, free as the air to common use.  Upon 
these incorporeal productions, the attribute of property is continued after 
such communication only in certain classes of cases where public policy 
has seemed to demand it.294
And that determination, Brandeis believed, should only be made through 
legislation.295  Of course, bringing news stories under copyright law would have solved 
that problem, whatever Brandeis’s views on its propriety.  Now, however, copyright and 
related laws have become nearly as restrictive as misappropriation.  In particular, the 
unholy combination of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act296 and the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Eldred v. Ashcroft297 now allows copyright owners to seal works away from 
the public utterly and forever.298
As noted above, this proposal would remove news stories from copyright 
protection, but would not restore an unbounded misappropriation tort.  Rather, the 
294
 248 U.S. at 250.
295 Id. at 267.
296
 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq.
297 537 U.S. 186, 204 (2003) (upholding a 20-year extension of the copyright term and reaffirming 
Congress’s authority to set the duration of copyrights).
298
 The DMCA effectively destroys the first-sale doctrine for all digital media as well.  
Under the first-sale doctrine, the first purchaser of a newspaper, for example, can legally 
sell, rent or give it away to another prospective reader without running afoul of the 
copyright laws.  17 U.S.C. 109(a).   Rights management tools safeguarded by the DMCA 
could prevent the first reader from downloading, printing or forwarding the articles that 
appear only in digital format.  See, e.g., Comments of the Library Associations, Before the 
Library of Congress, the U.S. Copyright Office, and the Department of Commerce, 
National Telecommunications and Information Administration, Inquiry Regarding 
Sections 109 and 117, Docket No. 000522150-0150-01 (Aug. 4, 2000), 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/comments/Init018.pdf (visited Feb. 9, 
2004), at 4.  But see U.S. Copyright Office, DMCA Section 104 Report (Aug. 2001) at 
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/dmca_study.html (visited Feb. 9, 2004).
67
proposal would permit a sharply curtailed tort claim only where the republisher directly 
competes with the original producer – that is, non-transformative uses – and temporary 
embargos are broken.  Tort claims would also be available for violating the moral right of 
attribution – as Justice Holmes advocated in his concurring opinion in INS v. AP299 – or 
the moral right of integrity.300  The remaining question is whether these very limited legal
rights are sufficient to preserve the incentive to produce high quality journalism.
C.  Preserving Quality Journalism
Underlying all copyright law is the idea of incentive.  The constitutional language 
authorizing Congress to grant this limited monopoly to authors in their writings declares 
that its purpose is to “To promote the Progress of Science,”301 i.e., knowledge, and the 
Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the profit motive to the overall  
copyright scheme.302  It is certainly appropriate to ask what incentive news organizations 
will have to gather and disseminate news in the absence of copyright protection.
Of course, as soon as the question is asked, the answer becomes obvious.  News 
stories have only been subject to copyright for the last century or so, but news has been 
gathered and disseminated for millennia.  Mitchell Stephens tells us our “urge to tell” the 
299
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news is deeply engrained in our collective psyche.303  “[M]ost of the world’s peoples 
have given away the news they have stumbled upon without charge. … Even where news 
dissemination becomes a profession, those professionals have found that they can obtain 
their raw material – fresh information – from their sources without financial charge.”304
Unlike food, shelter or clothing, most news has value only in the 
telling; it is worthless when wrapped in silence.  And news spoils too 
quickly to allow it to be squirreled away for future use….
Not that we bother to calculate the perishability or economic utility 
of some choice bit of news before we share it or wait for a nudge from 
social pressure to spread the news we have collected.  We give news as we 
receive it – eagerly.  We are, most of us, free and enthusiastic news-
tellers.305
Stephens goes on to explain that the “act of telling news brings with it a series of 
ego gratifications: the opportunity to appear well informed, knowledgeable, current…; 
the chance to capture attention, to perform and win appreciation; and the privilege of 
branding events with one’s own conclusions.”306   He finds that news-tellers’ own 
perceptions and experiences are enhanced by sharing them, which bestows the power to 
invest those events witnessed or experienced with validity and importance, “events with 
the stature of news.”307
News, then, is both pulled and pushed through our society…: the 
uninformed anxious to obtain news, the informed eager to give it away.  
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Even without benefit of sophisticated information technologies, the news, 
driven by these complementary desires, can obtain impressive speeds.”308
But the argument can be made that this natural inclination to gather and 
disseminate news will have little impact in the modern world, where a significant amount 
of capital is required to reach a mass audience – even through the Internet – and the 
absence of copyright protection and, therefore, the prospect of future returns, is hardly 
conducive to investment.  One could imagine the General Electrics and Disneys pulling 
out of the news business altogether, leaving us to rely on Internet “blogs” or even more 
primitive equivalents for our news.  
This rather bleak view is predicated at least two questionable assumptions.  First, 
that all major media corporations place the bottom line ahead of their civic 
responsibilities as journalists.  While that might be true of a General Electric or Disney, it 
is much harder to imagine the New York Times or Associated Press “pulling out of the 
news business” under any conceivable copyright or non-copyright regime.  Whatever 
revenues the print media may receive from their copyrights, or whatever losses might be 
incurred by the absence of copyright, surely constitute a tiny fraction of their overall 
revenue and an even smaller portion of their incentive to publish.  
The second assumption is that the departure of these media giants from the news 
business would mean a corresponding loss of  quality journalism.  As discussed in Part I, 
one might well take issue with the proposition that we’re getting quality journalism now 
from their involvement.   As Baker points out, media firms “cannot adequately capture 
308 Id.
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the positive benefits of investigative journalism” and will therefore “disproportionately 
underproduce the most valuable investigative material.”309
Baker uses the example of evening news programs to suggest that the public may 
receive “only marginally more benefits from a number of virtually identical products” 
produced a great expense than it does from a single product produced far more 
cheaply.310  “For example, both NBC and ABC evening news might cost roughly the 
same to produce, but if the programs are sufficiently similar, the public might receive 
virtually the same value, an evening news program, whether or not the second exists.”311
In short, any concern that depriving the media industry of copyright protection for 
hard news will deprive the public of quality journalism is probably unfounded, or at least, 
exaggerated.  Indeed, I believe this proposal would result in a reinvigorated journalism, 
one that features a much greater role for the independent journalist, and a somewhat
lesser role for the profit-motivated media company.  
Incorporation of Guild contract language into my proposal reflects my view that 
strengthening the bond between reporter and audience, even at the expense of the 
employer-employee relationship, is a healthy step in the right direction.312  I am not 
prepared to advocate Baker’s most radical suggestion, the enactment of a law permitting 
journalists to elect their own editors, thus insulating them from owners’ profit-motivated 
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interference,313 but I am sympathetic to the development of a cadre of reporters and 
editors whose first allegiance is to their professional standards, rather than the bottom-
line orientation of ownership.314
In the final analysis, the production of quality journalism will depend on 
individual reporters and editors.  The law, especially copyright law, can only nudge the 
media industry in one direction or another.  I am under no illusion that this modest 
proposal will ever be adopted by Congress.  But someday, somewhere, some enlightened 
newspaper publisher just might dedicate all news stories to the public and challenge other 
publishers to do the same.  Then, and only then, will the public really own what Philip 
Graham called the “first rough draft of history.”315
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